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TRAFFIC STOP FEDERALISM: PROTECTING NORTH
CAROLINA BLACK DRIVERS FROM THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Anthony J. Ghiotto*
ABSTRACT
Black drivers face a different constitutional reality than whites the
moment they step behind the wheel in North Carolina. Although
black drivers represent only about twenty-two percent of the North
Carolina population, thirty-two percent of all traffic stops involve
black drivers. This racial disparity may raise suspicion of either
implicit or explicit racial profiling on the part of police departments,
but the reality is that North Carolina law does not expressly prohibit
racial profiling. Instead, so long as the police officers have an
objective basis to stop a driver—and they may choose from any of the
hundreds of misdemeanor traffic regulations—their implicit or
explicit racism is largely irrelevant.
Once stopped, the power dynamic only increases in favor of the
police. Police officers may request a drug dog to “sniff” around a
driver’s vehicle with no suspicion, knowing that should the dog alert
to the presence of drugs, there would then be probable cause to
search the entirety of the vehicle without a search warrant. If the
drug dog does not arrive prior to completing the objective of the
traffic stop, the police officers may continue to hold the driver if
there is reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. The police officers may
develop this reasonable suspicion through seemingly innocent
behavior on the part of the driver, including nervousness or
disrespectfulness towards the police officers. The police officers may
also expand the scope of the stop by asking for consent to search the
vehicle. Minimal consideration is given to whether a black driver,
shaped by prior personal and historical experiences with law
enforcement, can refuse consent or to terminate the encounter with
the police.
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law. J.D. 2005, Emory
University School of Law; B.A. 2001, University of Illinois. I thank my colleagues
Bobbi Jo Boyd and Daniel Tilly for their encouragement and support. I also thank
Callie Davis and Sarah Sponaugle for their research assistance.
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This article argues that the racial disparities for traffic stops and
searches are the fault of two supreme courts: first, the United States
Supreme Court for creating a traffic stop framework built on a
number of supposed objective standards that give excess deference to
police officers’ subjective beliefs and expectations while ignoring the
realities and experiences of black drivers; second, the North
Carolina Supreme Court for its blind acquiescence to the framework
established by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article proceeds to
argue that North Carolina may protect its own drivers by exercising
traffic stop federalism and interpreting its own constitution to
consider the experience of its black drivers. Lastly, the Article
concludes by arguing that North Carolina may serve as an example
to other states who seek to protect their own black drivers from the
U.S. Supreme Court.
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“Federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that serves only
to limit the scope of human liberty. Rather, it must necessarily be
furthered significantly when state courts thrust themselves into a
position of prominence in the struggle to protect the people of our
nation from governmental intrusions on their freedoms.”1
- Justice William Brennan
Interviewer: “Do you remember what you pulled ‘em over for?”
Officer Jeronimo Yanez: “Um, I wanted to pay attention to that
because we had a strong armed robbery last week uh which involved
two African American males um, one having a firearm and pointing it
at the clerk and then the other uh the victim told me that he also had
a firearm but I wasn’t able to see it when the video was reviewed.
Um, so I was sitting at the intersection and I see a white vehicle. I
can’t remember what kind of vehicle it was. Um but I see two
occupants. What I believed was two occupants inside the car. And I
couldn’t make out the passenger. But I knew the passenger had a hat
on. And I couldn’t make out if it was a guy or girl I just knew that
they were both African American and the driver uh appeared to me
that he appeared to match the uh physical description of the one of
our suspects from the strong arm robbery, gunpoint.”
Interviewer: “What is that description?”
Officer Yanez: “Um it was a (sigh) I can’t remember the height,
weight but I remember that it was, the male had dreadlocks around
shoulder length.”
Interviewer: “Um-hm”
Officer Yanez: “Or longer hair around shoulder length. And, um it
wasn’t specified if it was corn rows or dreadlocks or straight hair.
Um and then just kind of distinct facial features with like a kind of
like a wide set nose and uh I saw that in the driver of the vehicle.”2

1.
2.

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION,
TRANSCRIPT, 9–10 (2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3870611-Yan
ez-BCA-Interview-Transcript-7-7-16.html.
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INTRODUCTION
At 9:05 p.m. on July 6, 2016, Officer Jeronimo Yanez with the St.
Anthony, Minnesota, police department activated his squad lights to
pull over a vehicle driven by Philando Castile.3 Officer Yanez
stopped the vehicle because he believed that Castile matched the
description of a suspect from an armed robbery about a week prior.4
Officer Yanez later explained his suspicion was based on the facts
that Castile was African American, appeared to have dreadlocks, and
had a “kind of a wide set nose.”5 After stopping Castile’s vehicle,
Officer Yanez approached and smelled what he believed to be burnt
marijuana.6 He also noticed that the passenger was a female and that
a young child was in the back.7 Officer Yanez informed Castile that
he was stopped due to a broken taillight and asked for his license and
registration.8 Castile informed Officer Yanez that he had a gun and
reached between his right leg and the center console.9 Officer Yanez
suspected Castile was reaching for his gun, in part because of the
burnt marijuana smell, and informed Castile to stop reaching several
times.10 Both Castile and his passenger responded several times that
he was not reaching for his gun.11 Officer Yanez then fired seven
shots at Castile.12 Castile died about twenty minutes after the
shooting.13 The entire traffic stop lasted less than one minute.14
Prior to his fatal traffic stop, police officers had stopped the thirtytwo-year-old Castile forty-six times, all pursuant to traffic stops.15
According to an analysis performed by National Public Radio, only
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Chao Xiong, Police Officer Charged in Fatal Shooting of Philando Castile, STAR
TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2016, 9:54 AM), http://www.startribune.com/ramsey-county-attorney
-choi-to-announce-update-in-castile-shooting/401484635/.
MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 2, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Philando Castile: Transcript of Facebook Live Shooting Aftermath, STAR TRIB. (July
7, 2016, 4:27 PM), http://www.startribune.com/transcript-of-facebook-live-shootingaftermath-video/385850431/.
Xiong, supra note 3.
Oladipo Fadeyi, Miscarriage of Justice for Philando Castile, OURVOICESMATTER
(July 12, 2017), https://www.ourvoicesmattermd.org/blog//miscarriage-of-justice-forphilando-castile.
Xiong, supra note 3.
Eyder Peralta & Cheryl Corley, The Driving Life and Death of Philando Castile,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 15, 2016, 4:51 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/07/15/485835272/the-driving-life-and-death-of-philando-castile.
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six of these traffic stops stemmed from suspicions that could have
been observed from outside of the vehicle.16 Castile’s history with
law enforcement and his subsequent death at the hands of the police
highlight the issue of racial bias in traffic stops. This article asks
what allows police officers like Officer Yanez to make traffic stops
based on their suspicion that drivers like Philando Castile share a hair
style and a broad nose with an armed robbery suspect? What
consideration, if any, is given or should be given to the personal
experiences of the driver in how the police officers conduct traffic
stops? If the United States Supreme Court sanctions such racial bias
in traffic stops, could and should states abandon the Supreme Court’s
framework and protect their own drivers from such racial bias?
These issues of race and police activity are especially relevant in
North Carolina where the racial disparity in traffic stops and
subsequent searches is dramatic.17 After a series of racially charged
traffic stops in the 1990s, the North Carolina legislature mandated
that police departments report racial data involving each effectuated
traffic stop.18 Social scientists recently aggregated this data and
found that over a twenty-year period in North Carolina, blacks
constituted about 22% of the population but accounted for 32% of all
traffic stops.19 In 2010 alone, the odds of a given white person being
stopped by police were 13.4% whereas blacks’ 21.9% chances of
being stopped were much higher.20 Once stopped, blacks then faced
a much higher likelihood than whites of being searched.21 Over the
twenty-year timeframe, North Carolina police conducted 700,000
searches pursuant to a traffic stop.22 White drivers were searched
2.35% of the time they were stopped.23 Black drivers were searched
5.05% of the time.24 The disparity becomes even greater when the
traffic stop was made for investigatory purposes as opposed to safety

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP & KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS:
WHAT 20 MILLION TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND RACE 69 (2018).
See id. at 36–39; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143B-903 (West 2014).
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 69.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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purposes. For investigatory stops, black drivers faced a 170%
increased chance of being searched compared to whites. 25
These studies reflect that the social phenomenon of “driving while
black” is a reality for North Carolina black drivers.26 Black drivers
are disproportionately stopped and searched as compared to white
drivers.27 Acknowledging that there are cultural, sociological, and
structural issues that account for the problem and the solution, this
article instead focuses on the legal frameworks in place to govern
traffic stops and the normative legal alternatives available to address
it.28 Specifically, the racial disparity found in the amount of traffic
stops and searches in North Carolina is largely the result of a
conflicted traffic stop framework established by the U.S. Supreme
Court and that a solution may be for North Carolina to abandon that
framework and establish its own.29
On one end of the framework, the U.S. Supreme Court created a
seemingly objective-based standard throughout the traffic stop
process that gives deference to the subjective beliefs and experiences
of an individual police officer.30 On the other end of the framework,
the U.S. Supreme Court minimally considers the historical and
personal experiences of the driver.31 Here, the U.S. Supreme Court
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 86 (distinguishing between a “safety” stop and an “investigatory” stop). The
authors “argue that stops for ‘investigatory’ purposes are more likely to relate to
minor offenses that may serve as pretext for pulling a driver over.” Id. at 53.
See generally David A. Harris, Driving While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544,
560 (1997) (“[D]ata reveals several patterns, which African-Americans and Hispanics
understand quite well already: police use traffic regulations to investigate many
innocent citizens . . . and African-Americans and Hispanics are the targets of choice . .
. .”); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why ‘Driving While
Black’ Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266 (1999) (“[W]hat many African-American
drivers say they go through every day: police using traffic offenses as an excuse to
stop and conduct roadside investigations of black drivers and their cars . . . .”); Kami
Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an
Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 26 (2011) (“There is
strong evidence that racial minorities believe law enforcement officers engage in
racial profiling. African-Americans have long argued that police officers scrutinize
their behavior more closely . . . .”); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 130–37 (2011); Frank R.
Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kelsey Shoub, The Fears of Driving While Black in
NC Are True. The Data Prove It., NEWS & OBSERVER (July 30, 2018, 8:48 AM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article215562040.html.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 69, 85.
See infra Part I.
See infra Sections I.C–D.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.D.
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fails to make a simple recognition: the black experience with police
is different and unique from the white experience.32 It is impacted
and formed by the historical legacy of slavery,33 Jim Crow,34 and the
era of mass incarceration.35 It is defined by the constant and repeated
traffic stops incurred by today’s black drivers.36 The traffic stop
framework must reflect that difference in experience, but it does not.
Instead, it treats drivers as colorless non-entities, all sharing the same
life experiences and expectations of encounters with police officers.37
When the two ends of the framework intersect, behavior on the part
of black drivers that reflects historical and personal experiences with
police officers then provides a reasonable basis for a police officer to
stop the driver and to escalate the stop to a search of the vehicle.38
Traffic stop federalism presents a practical and feasible normative
legal alternative to the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework.39 Traffic
32.

33.
34.

35.
36.

37.

38.
39.

See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters” Some Preliminary Thoughts
About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV 243,
256 (1991) (“[W]hen whites are stopped by the police, they too feel uneasy and often
experience fear. . . . But I wonder whether the average white person worries that an
otherwise routine police encounter may lead to a violent confrontation.”); Richard
Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and Response,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (2008) (“Over time, whites and blacks come to view
police and policing ‘in strikingly different terms.’ Blacks especially are more likely
than others to believe that the police are unaccountable, abusing citizens and treating
minorities harshly.” (internal citations omitted)).
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 22–26.
See generally JENNIFER RITTERHOUSE, GROWING UP JIM CROW: HOW BLACK AND
WHITE SOUTHERN CHILDREN LEARNED RACE (2006); Steven A. Berrey, Resistance
Begins at Home: The Black Family and Lessons in Survival and Subversion in Jim
Crow Mississippi, 3 BLACK WOMEN, GENDER & FAM. 65, 65–90 (2009).
See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 185–220.
See, e.g., Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males:
Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 439, 451 (2004) (“The use of racial profiling in the selective enforcement of
public laws is most evident in traffic stops by law enforcement officers. It can also be
a most humiliating and frightening experience for anyone, especially AfricanAmerican males who may fear imminent harm from police officers.”).
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that subjective
intentions are not a factor in determining whether an officer has probable cause, and
legally allowing for the treatment of drivers as colorless non-entities).
See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 32, at 253 (“Black men know they are liable to be
stopped at anytime, and that when they question the authority of the police, the
response from the cops is often swift and violent.”).
See generally John Paul Stevens, The Other Constitutions, N.Y. REV., Dec. 6, 2018, at
33 (reviewing JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018)). Justice Stevens agrees with the
author that “state judiciaries can set an example for the federal judiciary and
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stop federalism recognizes that the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the
federal constitution to set a “floor” to the amount of rights a state
must afford its citizens.40 States are then free to interpret their own
constitutions to afford its citizens broader and more extensive
constitutional rights and protections.41 In the traffic stop context,
state courts are free to conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment fails to adequately safeguard
black drivers, and to instead interpret their own state constitution to
establish a new framework more representative of the black
experience.42
North Carolina serves as an example of both the potential successes
and downfalls of traffic stop federalism as a normative solution to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s conflicted framework.43 As the ninth most
populous state,44 North Carolina has a growing minority population,45

40.
41.

42.

43.
44.
45.

ultimately persuade it to endorse rights that they have recognized and that should have
prevailed as a matter of federal law for decades.” Id.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008).
Brennan, supra note 1, at 500–01; see also JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT
SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16–21
(2018); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 20–32 (2013).
See, e.g., Timothy P. O’Neill, Vagrants in Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traffic Stops
and Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 761–62
(2009); Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision, 66 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1039, 1044–45 (2016); Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 633 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2008) (“[W]e were convinced that the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment ‘fails to adequately safeguard our citizens’
right to privacy, . . . fails to adequately protect citizens from unwarranted government
intrusion, and . . . unjustifiably reduces the incentive of police officers to honor
citizen’s constitutional rights.” (quoting Joseph v. State, 145 P.3d 595, 605 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2006))).
See infra Section I.C.
Benjamin Elisha Sawe, The 50 US States Ranked by Population, WORLDATLAS,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/us-states-by-population.html (last updated Sept.
14, 2018).
Jessica Stanford, NC in Focus: Black Population in North Carolina, 2016, UNC
CAROLINA DEMOGRAPHY (Feb. 8, 2018), https://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2018/02/08/
nc-in-focus-black-population-in-north-carolina-2016/ (projecting that although the
Black population in North Carolina is expected to grow, it will grow at the same rate
as the state’s overall population, leaving similar overall percentages); see generally
Caroline Metzler & Gavin Off, Hispanic Population Continues to Rise in NC as White
Population Trails, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 25, 2018, 3:53 PM), https://www.
charlotteobserver.com/latest-news/article213539719.html (focusing on North
Carolina’s Hispanic population while also showing statistics about the growth in the
black population).
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and a history that encompasses the black experience in America.46
Its courts have recognized that it has the authority to interpret its own
constitution independently and more broadly than the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.47
The circumstances are ripe for the North Carolina courts to address
the racial disparity in traffic stops and searches by interpreting the
state constitution to protect its black drivers.48 And yet, North
Carolina has also exhibited the biggest weakness of traffic stop
federalism—its courts have rejected it in the context of traffic stops
and instead have blindly acquiesced to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
framework.49
While this article focuses on North Carolina to address the legal
frameworks in place to govern traffic stops and the normative legal
alternatives available to address the racial disparities in stops and
searches, the lessons learned from North Carolina are applicable
nationwide. The driving while black phenomenon is not limited to
North Carolina.50 A study focusing on Kansas City traffic stops
found that police officers stopped 24% of all black drivers per year
compared to 12% for whites,51 while a Missouri investigation
revealed that blacks were 85% more likely to be stopped by police.52
Additionally, social scientists surveyed 2,324 drivers and found that
black men are “by far the most likely to be stopped for investigatory
reasons.”53 Their study concluded that over the course of a year, an
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

51.
52.

53.

See generally JEFFERY J. CROW ET AL., A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN NORTH
CAROLINA (N.C. Office of Archives and History ed., 2d rev. ed. 2011).
State v. Arrington, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (N.C. 1984); see State v. McClendon, 517
S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999) (“[T]his Court is not bound by opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of
the United States.”).
See infra Part III.
See infra Sections I.C, II.B, II.D, III.B.
ELIZABETH DAVIS, ANTHONY WHYDE & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SPECIAL REPORT: CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 1, 4 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf (noting that traffic stops were the
most common form of police-initiated contact for Americans and when comparing
driving population traffic stop percentages analyzed by race, blacks were more likely
than whites to be the driver in a traffic stop, as 9.6% of all black drivers were stopped
whereas only 8.6% of all white drivers were stopped).
CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
CITIZENSHIP 20, 52 (2014).
Jim Salter, Missouri Report: Blacks 85 Percent More Likely to Be Stopped,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (June 1, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/58d9ad846ef14b9
3915ee26d3cf4663e.
EPP ET AL., supra note 51, at 20, 66.
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African American man who is less than 40 years old and is driving an
older luxury car has a 44% likelihood of an investigative stop. A
similar white man driving any other vehicle has an 8% chance of
such a stop, and a white woman has only a 4% chance.54
Nationwide, black drivers are also more likely to be searched than
white drivers.55 The survey of 2,324 drivers revealed that black
drivers were five times more likely than white drivers to have their
vehicle searched during the traffic stop.56 A recent Stanford study
found that, across several states, white drivers were searched in 2%
of all traffic stops while 3.5% of black drivers were searched.57 The
study concluded that black drivers had “approximately twice the odds
of being searched relative to white drivers.”58
This nationwide problem devolves to the majority of states with
traffic stops being a predominately state function.59 Equipped with
their own constitutions, cultures, and experiences, states are then
presented with the opportunity to exercise traffic stop federalism to
protect their own black drivers.60 North Carolina’s consideration and
rejection of such a normative approach can guide these state Supreme
Courts in their own consideration of adopting a broader traffic stop
framework that better protects their black drivers. Perhaps, too, an
increase in states exercising traffic stop federalism may trigger the
U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider its own framework.61
This article proceeds along the progression of a traffic stop. Part I
discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework for the initiation of
the stop,62 North Carolina’s interpretation of this framework,63 and
how this framework intersects with the black experience to legitimize
racially based traffic stops.64 Part II transitions from the initiation of
the stop to the police conducting an investigation of the driver and
the vehicle.65 This part focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 69–70 (“Investigatory stops target black men, and, especially, lower income
black men.”).
See id. at 2.
Id. at 20, 105.
Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops
Across the United States 6 (June 18, 2017) (unpublished working paper) (on file with
the Stanford Open Policing Project).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 1.
See generally SUTTON, supra note 41, at 17.
See Stevens, supra note 39.
See infra Sections I.A–B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
See infra Part II.
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framework for using drug dogs to establish probable cause to search
a vehicle,66 and the use of reasonable suspicion to continue holding a
driver past the purpose of the traffic stop.67 After discussing North
Carolina’s interpretation of this framework, this part next analyzes
how the framework affords deference to the subjective beliefs of law
enforcement and no such deference to the black experience.68 Part III
concentrates on consent-based searches and the framework
established by the U.S. Supreme Court and North Carolina Supreme
Court to assess whether consent is voluntarily given.69 This part
concludes by examining how these tests fail to consider black
experiences with police in determining the voluntariness of consent.70
I.

MAKING THE STOP—A QUASI-OBJECTIVE STANDARD

Traffic stops are governed by the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”71 Because a traffic stop is considered a “seizure” under the
Fourth Amendment,72 it must not be “unreasonable” under the
circumstances.73 What is unclear is what role does race play, if any,
in the determination of whether a traffic stop is unreasonable.
In Whren v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court first considered
the role that race may play in a police officer’s decision to stop a
vehicle.74 Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Antonin Scalia
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

See infra Sections II.A–B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Sections II.D–E.
See infra Sections III.A–B.
See infra Section III.C.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).
Id. at 810.
See id. Much has been written about Whren and pretext stops. See, e.g., Lewis R.
Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1413, 1421 (2013) (“The Court’s holding in Whren merely solidified a trend in
United States jurisprudence toward ignoring police officers’ racial biases, admitted or
otherwise.”); Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the
“Would Have” Test Work?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 930 (2008) (“[S]uch a high level
of discretion provides the police with the ability to use traffic stops based upon
legitimate traffic infractions as pretexts to investigate other, possibly criminal activity
for which the police have no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.”); Wayne
R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,”
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1859 (2004) (“The totality
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noted that traffic stops at best “interfere with freedom of movement,
are inconvenient, and consume time and at worst may create
substantial anxiety.”75 Justice Scalia in agreement with the rest of the
Supreme Court reflected the dominantly elite and white viewpoint of
traffic stops: they are not life changing events, but rather anxiety
ridden inconveniences that keep someone from getting where they
are going on time.76 For many drivers, especially white drivers, this
may be the case for most traffic stops.77 However, for black drivers,
traffic stops mean much more than a time-consuming
inconvenience.78 The stop itself is angst-ridden and filled with
uncertainty. 79 Rather than ending at a citation or a warning, the stop

75.
76.
77.

78.

79.

of the Court’s analysis in Whren is, to put it mildly, quite disappointing.”); Arnold H.
Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
535, 557 (2002) (“[T]he Court seemed either oblivious to, or unconcerned with, its
implicit sanctioning of unbridled arbitrariness or racial profiling . . . .”); David A.
Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car at
Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 821 (2002) (“By unequivocally and categorically
rejecting the notion that a traffic stop could ever be unconstitutional so long as the
officer could identify any traffic or equipment violation, . . . Whren sent a clear and
unmistakable message to the police: You may, in your complete discretion, stop
almost any car at any time.”); Alberto B. Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren:
Searching for Objective Evidence of the Fourth Amendment on the Nation’s Roads,
90 KY. L.J. 75, 79 (2001–2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United
States effectively blunted any efforts to challenge racial profiling under the Fourth
Amendment.”); Hon. Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional
Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 597, 605–06 (1999) (examining the application of Whren in Pennsylvania);
David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A Pretext to Subvert the Fourth
Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 91 (1998); Patricia Leary & Stephanie
Rae Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police Discretion to Patrol
the Fourth Amendment’s Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1025 (1996) (“Whren is a rickety piece of judicial scholarship. It
is built upon unreasoned distinctions, perversions of precedent, a question-begging
unarticulated and unsupported premise, bootstrapping, logical inconsistencies, and a
narrow vision of the Fourth Amendment.”).
Whren, 517 U.S. at 817 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657).
Id. at 807.
See Nsikan Akpan, Police Respect Whites More than Blacks During Traffic Stops,
Language Analysis Finds, PBS (June 5, 2017, 4:26 PM), https://www.pbs.org/news
hour/science/police-respect-whites-blacks-traffic-stops-language-analysis-finds.
See EPP ET AL., supra note 51, at 8 (“This racial difference in police practices and
people’s lived experience and shared knowledge of these practices is why black
people commonly rate stops that they have experienced as unfair, while whites are
generally more sanguine about the stops that they have experienced.”).
See Michael A. Fletcher, For Black Motorists, a Never-Ending Fear of Being
Stopped, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/
04/the-stop-race-police-traffic/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). Across the country, lawabiding black and Hispanic drivers are left frightened and humiliated by the inordinate
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may be extended to justify a search of the vehicle.80 Those who feel
unnecessarily stopped may feel alienated and delegitimized from
society.81 In turn, this alienation may impact how they behave during
the next traffic stop.82
This part examines the legal framework for when police officers
may stop a vehicle.83 Section B addresses the suspicion needed for
police to stop a vehicle.84 The next section then moves to the
proposed normative legal solution—traffic stop federalism—by
examining North Carolina’s consideration and implementation of the
U.S. Supreme Court framework.85 Lastly, the last section in this part
examines the impact of these court decisions on black drivers.86
A. Whren and the Pretext Possible Probable Cause
On June 10, 1993, Michael Whren and James Brown, two young
black men, stopped their vehicle at a stop sign in Southeast
Washington, D.C.87 The Nissan Pathfinder they were driving had

80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

attention they receive from police, who often see them as criminals. Id. Such
treatment leaves minorities feeling violated, angry, and wary of police and their
motives. Id.
See id.; see also supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 32.
See Tonya Maxwell, In Traffic Stops, Disparity in Black and White, CITIZEN-TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2016, 2:34 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2016/08/
27/traffic-stops-disparity-black-and-white/89096656/. Billy Robertson, a black 67year-old pastor in Asheville, North Carolina, discussed a traffic stop that occurred two
years prior after being pulled over by an officer who said he had crossed the yellow
line. Id.
I don’t want to be no accident. I’m serious. These are my hands.
. . . [Black people] got to be talking about ‘I am reaching into my
pocket for my license. Cause I don’t want to be no accident.’ . . .
When I was a kid in the black neighborhood – I’m talking about
Asheville – the community would tell us, they would say, ‘When
you go to town, keep your head down.’ . . . They were fearful of
young black men being abused. . . . This is something that was
engrained in black males in the African-American community,
way back, years ago. That same thing is taking place now, there’s
such a fear.
Id.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section I.C.
See infra Section I.D.
Brief for the Petitioners at 2−4, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 955841), 1996 WL 75758.
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temporary tags.88 While stopped at the stop sign, several plainclothes
vice officers patrolling the area for drug violations in an unmarked
vehicle observed Whren and Brown.89 The plainclothes officers
believed that the driver was stopped too long, approximately twenty
seconds, at the stop sign.90 They also observed the driver looking
down into the lap of the passenger while stopped at the stop sign.91
The officers made a U-turn to follow the vehicle, at which point, the
vehicle “turned suddenly to its right, without signaling, and sped off
at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.”92 At this point, the officers stopped the
vehicle and observed two large plastic bags of crack cocaine in
Whren’s hands.93
During the suppression hearing, the primary vice officer, Officer
Ephraim Soto, testified that he and the other vice officers were
patrolling a high drug area and that their objective was to find
narcotic activity occurring, not to conduct traffic patrols.94 Soto
provided he was “out there almost strictly to do drug investigations”
and that he stopped vehicles for traffic violations “[n]ot very often at
all.”95 But Soto did acknowledge that he made the stop to investigate
two potential traffic violations: being stopped at the stop sign for an
excessive amount of time and speeding.96
Soto’s testimony differed slightly from his partner, Officer Homer
Littlejohn.97 Littlejohn did not attempt to justify the stop based on a
traffic violation.98 Instead, Littlejohn testified that the officers made
the stop because they had reasonable suspicion that the drivers were
engaged in some sort of drug activity.99 Littlejohn emphasized that
“[w]e did not know they had drugs in that vehicle at that time, just
had a reasonable suspicion as to their actions as to why they were
stopped at the stop sign for so long.”100
Soto and Littlejohn offered two competing justifications for
stopping the vehicle: violations of the traffic code and reasonable

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2−3.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 808–09.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 87, at 3−4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
See id. at 4−5.
Id. at 31a n.7.
Id.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 87, at 6 n.7.
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suspicion for drug activity.101
Whren and Brown, however,
challenged the stop based solely on Soto’s justification—the traffic
violation.102 They acknowledged that while Soto likely had probable
cause that Whren had committed two traffic violations—not giving
full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle and driving at
an unreasonable speed—this probable cause of traffic code violations
was not enough to stop a vehicle.103 Whren and Brown argued that
“the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that
total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a
police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given
motorist in a technical violation.”104 To Whren and Brown, this rule
would have dire consequences because “the ease with which officers
can identify civil traffic infractions creates the phenomenon of the
pretextual traffic stop–the use of traffic laws to evade constitutional
restraints.”105 This possibility was especially dangerous in the
context of race because “[i]f police are not required to exercise their
discretion within the confines of standard police procedure,” Whren
and Brown argued in their brief, “the decision whether to stop a
particular citizen for a particular minor traffic infraction will turn on
no more than ‘the price of our automobiles, the formality of our
dress, the shortness of our hair or the color of our skin.’”106 To
Whren and Brown, the officers observed them, followed them, and
stopped them not because of the traffic violations, but because they
were black.107 The traffic violations were then just a pretext to make
the stop.108
As such, Whren and Brown argued that the Fourth Amendment test
for traffic stops should not be whether the police officer had probable
cause of the traffic violation, “but rather, whether a police officer,
acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given.”109
The argument was fine, but distinct—rather than asking whether a
reasonable police officer could have made the traffic stop based upon
probable cause of a traffic violation the question should be whether a
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 87, at 41–49.
Id. at 13; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 87, at 22.
Id. (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 416 (1974)).
107. Id. at 13–15; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
108. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811.
109. Id. at 810.
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reasonable police officer would have made the traffic stop.110 By
asking whether a reasonable police officer would have made the
traffic stop based upon probable cause of a traffic violation, Whren
and Brown argued that courts should protect drivers against the
officers using traffic code violations as a pretext for racially based
stops.111 To Whren and Brown, reasonable plainclothes vice officers
patrolling for drug-related offenses would not have stopped a driver
for speeding and not paying attention while at a stop sign, rendering
their stop unconstitutional.112
The Supreme Court roundly rejected this argument in a unanimous
decision.113 Justice Scalia first considered whether police officers’
“ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on
the basis of probable cause . . . .”114 To Justice Scalia, the Court had
never held “outside the context of inventory search or administrative
inspection . . . , that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively
justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”115 Instead,
he highlighted that when law enforcement was acting within their
constitutional authority, especially when acting with probable cause,
the Court had “flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might
serve to strip the agents of their legal justification.”116 Justice Scalia
further relied on prior cases that “[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does
not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.”117 He
concluded that “these cases foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.”118 Acknowledging
that the Constitution does prohibit the selective enforcement of law
based on race, he noted that the Equal Protection Clause is the
appropriate forum for complaint and that “[s]ubjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”119
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 87, at 13–37; see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 87, at 22–23.
Id. at 41.
See generally Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (finding that while enforcement of the law
based on a race is unconstitutional, subjective intentions of race do not play a role in a
Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis).
Id. at 811.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 812–13 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 (1973) (“[A]
traffic-violation arrest . . . would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was a
‘mere pretext for a narcotics search . . . .’”).
Id. at 813 (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
Id.
Id.
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Justice Scalia then considered the test proposed by Whren and
Brown—whether a reasonable police officer would have made the
probable cause based traffic stop as opposed to whether a reasonable
police officer could have made the stop.120 He again rejected this
argument, but this time on the basis that the proposed approach was
too subjective in nature.121 Justice Scalia argued that to apply the test
proposed by Whren and Brown, the analysis would rest upon whether
the “conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a
reasonable police officer in the same circumstances would not have
made the stop for the reasons given[,]” and that this test is too
subjective in nature.122 In practice, he posits that “ordinarily one
would be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a
hypothetical constable–an exercise that might be called virtual
subjectivity.”123
The Court’s holding in Whren is substantial. It ultimately holds
that police officers may make a traffic stop whenever they have
probable cause of a traffic code violation.124 Behind that holding,
however, the Court rejects any consideration of the officer’s potential
racial bias or whether the traffic violation is pretext for other
unfounded suspicions.125 By refusing to consider whether a
reasonable police officer would have exercised his or her discretion
in making the stop, the Court sanctioned police officers to be able to
target black drivers, absent any suspicion, and follow those drivers
until he or she commits a traffic code violation.126
B. Expanding Whren—Reasonable Suspicion Based Stops
While Whren’s holding is substantial, it did leave two questions
left unanswered. First, what about Littlejohn’s justification for
making the traffic stop: was reasonable suspicion of drug activity
enough to stop the vehicle? And, second, what if police only have
reasonable suspicion of a traffic code violation, not probable cause?
The holding in Whren was that police may stop a vehicle if they had

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 813–14.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 812–13.
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 26, at 546 (“Police will not subject all drivers to traffic
stops in the way Whren allows. Rather . . . they will use the traffic code to stop a
hugely disproportionate number of African-Americans and Hispanics.”).
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probable cause of a traffic violation.127 Probable cause exists when
there is a fair probability or substantial chance a crime has been
committed and that the suspect committed it.128 In contrast,
reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard” and “requires a
showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.”129 A
finding of reasonable suspicion is satisfied by “some minimal level of
objective justification.”130
Generally, a reasonable suspicion
standard merely requires that a police officer have a “reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”131
In 2002, the Supreme Court considered whether law enforcement
may stop a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
alone. In United States v. Arvizu, a federal border control agent
received a notification that a border checkpoint sensor had been
triggered.132 This was problematic to the agent because it indicated
to him that the checkpoint was likely unmanned and when that
occurred previously, drug smugglers usually attempted to cross the
unmanned checkpoint.133 The agent began monitoring the area for
the vehicle that triggered the sensor and after he located a minivan—
which he knew was the vehicle used by drug smugglers—driving in
that direction he began to follow it.134 While following the minivan,
he made several observations that he believed were suspicious based
on his experience: the minivan slowed down, the driver appeared to
be stiff and rigid, the driver did not wave or acknowledge the agent,
the children waved in a way that he felt was compelled, and lastly the
vehicle turned into an area not generally frequented by minivans.135
Ultimately, the agent performed a registration check that revealed
that the minivan was registered to an address in an “area notorious

127. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
128. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244–46 (1983).
129. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968).
130. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).
131. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18
(1981) (“[T]he totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into
account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.”).
132. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 268–69 (2002).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 270.
135. Id. at 270–71.
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for alien and narcotics smuggling.”136 At this point, the agent
stopped the vehicle.137
The Supreme Court found this to be a lawful stop, not based on
whether the agent had probable cause of a traffic violation, but rather
on the agent’s reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in
drug smuggling.138 The Court noted “the Fourth Amendment is
satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot[.]’”139 Here, the Court
found that the agent was able to draw on his “own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to” him that “might well elude
an untrained person” in making the stop.140 Tellingly, all the factors
the agent relied upon were innocent in nature—the driving of a
minivan, not waving to the agent, a turn into an area not frequented
by minivans, and what appeared to be compelled waving—but were
perceived as suspicious by the agent’s subjective beliefs formed by
his experiences and training.141
The Supreme Court’s holding in Whren also left unanswered the
question of whether an officer’s reasonable suspicion of a traffic code
violation constituted a sufficient basis to stop a vehicle. While the
Supreme Court has not directly clarified whether Whren requires
probable cause as opposed to reasonable suspicion of a traffic code
violation,142 the majority of circuits interpreted the probable cause
136. Id. at 271.
137. Id. at 271–72 (emphasizing the fact that ultimately, the van was found to contain
128.85 pounds of marijuana).
138. Id. at 277.
139. Id. at 273 (relying on United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
140. Id.; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that a
reviewing court must give due weight to factual inferences drawn by resident judges
and local law enforcement officers).
141. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274–75 (“The court appeared to believe that each observation
by [the agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was
entitled to ‘no weight.’ Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer
analysis.” (citation omitted)); see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7–8 (rejecting a
distinction between “evidence of ‘ongoing criminal behavior,’” and “probabilistic”
evidence because it “creates unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one of the
relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment”); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (holding that while each act in a series was perhaps innocent in and
of itself, the Court held that taken together they amounted to reasonable suspicion).
142. But see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (“[T]he usual traffic stop is
more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop[]’ . . . than to a formal arrest. Under the
Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose
‘observations lead him reasonably to suspect’ that a particular person has committed,
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portion of Whren to be dicta.143 Specifically, “the Second, [Third,]
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits” have all
‘construed Whren to require only that the police have “reasonable
suspicion” to believe that a traffic law has been broken.’”144 To
support this interpretation of Whren, the circuits noted that the
reasonable suspicion “standard was for many years accepted as the
standard governing run of the mill traffic stops.”145 They further
noted there was “little in Whren to suggest that the Court meant to
create a new probable cause standard in the context of investigatory
traffic stops. Instead, the Court in Whren was responding to the
situation before it—one in which the officer obviously possessed
probable cause.”146
Thus, post-Whren, the Court and federal circuits expanded the
scope of what constitutes a permissible traffic stop.147 The result is
the current Supreme Court framework for making a traffic stop: a
police officer may follow a vehicle based on a hunch, even if that
hunch is solely based on racial bias, until that officer has either
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the driver committed a
traffic code violation or that criminal activity is afoot.148
C. The North Carolina Approach
North Carolina has a clear problem with police officers stopping
black drivers at a disproportionate rate.149
But, if the
disproportionate stopping of black drivers is partially the result of the

143.
144.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly . . . .”);
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 415 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]e held that
the analogue of the common traffic stop was the limited detention for investigation
authorized by Terry v. Ohio . . . .”).
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 723 (9th Cir. 2005) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)); see also
Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2005); United States
v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 998 (8th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 396 (citing United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076,
1081 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Id. at 397 (citing Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1104).
See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
See Lawton, supra note 42, at 1044.
See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text; see also BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 85 (“Driving while black exposes a driver to approximately twice the odds
of being pulled over, and once pulled over, to about twice the odds of being
searched.”).
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Supreme Court’s traffic stop framework, then is North Carolina—and
its black drivers—stuck with the problem? The answer is a
resounding no.150 A firmly held principle of federalism and state
constitutional law is “that States are independent sovereigns with
plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they
do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees.”151 While
federal law “sets minimum requirements that States must meet but
may exceed,” states must do so “by enacting appropriate legislation
or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution . . . .”152 North
Carolina is free to exercise traffic stop federalism and to interpret its
own constitution to broaden the Supreme Court’s framework.153
The ability to allow states to interpret their own constitutions to
provide extra rights to those provided by the federal constitution has
several benefits.154 As noted by Judge Jeffrey Sutton, “State courts
also have a freer hand in doing something the Supreme Court cannot:
allowing local conditions and traditions to affect their interpretation
of a constitutional guarantee and the remedies imposed to implement
that guarantee.”155 Under this approach, states with more sizeable
black populations, especially ones with a history of racial
discrimination and abuse by law enforcement, may be able to protect
these drivers better by interpreting their constitutions to afford these
drivers more constitutional protections.156 States are different and
150. While a majority of states now interpret their state constitutions to allow pretextual
stops, like Whren, both Washington and New Mexico interpreted their constitutions to
reject Whren’s holding, with both states instead applying the totality of the
circumstances test. See Lawton, supra note 42, at 1044, 1048–51, 1054–55; see also
Schuster v. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 283 P.3d 288, 297
(N.M. 2012) (“New Mexico has departed from United States Supreme Court
precedent in Whren . . . by holding that pretextual traffic stops are constitutionally
unreasonable.”); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999) (“[P]olice may
enforce the traffic code . . . . They may not, however, use that authority as a pretext
or justification . . . .”); State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d 983, 991 (Wash. 2012) (“[A] mixedmotive traffic stop [is one that is] based on both legitimate and illegitimate grounds . .
. .”).
151. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008).
152. Id. at 288.
153. See State v. McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (N.C. 1984) (“State courts are no less
obligated to protect and no less capable of protecting a defendant’s federal
constitutional rights than are federal courts. In performing this obligation a state court
should exercise and apply its own independent judgment . . . .”).
154. See infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
155. SUTTON, supra note 41, at 17.
156. Cf. O’Neill, supra note 42, at 762 (“Vermont and North Dakota may not have a
‘driving while black’ problem for the simple reason that they have very few blacks.
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state “constitutional law respects and honors these differences
between and among the States by allowing interpretations of the fifty
state constitutions to account for these differences in culture,
geography, and history.”157 Further, as Justice Brennan noted, “one
of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double
source of protection for the rights of our citizens.”158 When the
federal courts fail to provide sufficient protection of individual rights,
federalism then allows the states to provide this greater protection.159
North Carolina provides a near-perfect example of the potential
merits of traffic stop federalism.160 It is currently the ninth mostpopulated state and has a rapidly growing minority population.161
The history of North Carolina mirrors the struggle of black
Americans, stretching from slavery to Jim Crow to the War on Drugs
and finally to the disproportionate rate of black traffic stops.162 The
state constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures stands apart from the Fourth Amendment.163 Finally, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has repeatedly held that it is “not
bound by opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States
construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the United
States.”164 Thus, the most realistic normative legal solution for
North Carolina to address the disparity in traffic stops is to reject the
Supreme Court’s framework and to adopt its own, consistent with the
experiences of its citizens and its more expansive state constitution.
Prior to Whren, the North Carolina courts appeared willing to do
just that.165 In 1990, six years prior to Whren, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals considered the case of State v. Morocco.166 At
approximately 7:40 am, a police officer observed Larry Fremont

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.

Thus, the ‘limited lockstep’ doctrine is the Illinois Supreme Court’s excuse for not
fine-tuning constitutional law to fit the realities of life in Illinois.”).
SUTTON, supra note 41, at 17.
Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
See id.
See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Arrington v. State, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (N.C. 1984); State v. McClendon, 517
S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999).
Arrington, 319 S.E.2d at 260; see also State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 555 (N.C.
1988) (“[T]he authority to construe our own constitution differently from the
construction by the United States Supreme Court of the Federal Constitution, as long
as our citizens are thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are guaranteed by the
parallel federal provision.”).
See infra notes 166–72 and accompanying text.
State v. Morocco, 393 S.E.2d 545, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
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Morocco driving a vehicle without wearing a seatbelt.167 The officer
stopped Morocco based on this violation and subsequently
discovered cocaine in the vehicle.168 In challenging the stop,
Morocco claimed that the initial basis for the stop—driving without a
seatbelt—was a pretext.169 To determine whether the stated reason
for the stop was a pretext, the court stated that “the trial court should
look at what a reasonable officer would do rather than what an officer
validly could do.”170 Although the court held that a reasonable
officer would have stopped Morocco for not wearing his seatbelt, this
test the U.S. Supreme Court eventually rejected in Whren.171 As
established by the North Carolina Court of Appeals—regarding
whether a reasonable police officer would have made the stop—the
court acknowledged the possibility that pretextual stops, even
supported by some objective basis, would still fall outside of
constitutional protection if a reasonable police officer in that situation
would not have made the stop.172
In 1999, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court directly
considered Whren.173 Police officers stopped Paul McClendon after
they observed two cars travelling approximately seven miles per hour
over the speed limit and the rear car, driven by McClendon,
following too closely to the first car.174 The officer who made the
stop testified that he used the speeding violation as an opportunity to
advance a drug investigation, believing that the front car was a decoy
vehicle to the second car.175 He testified that based on his extensive
167. Id. The Court noted that the trial court made the finding of fact that “[t]he defendant
appeared not to be wearing a properly fastened seatbelt. In North Carolina, this is an
offense for which an officer may issue a citation.” Id.
168. Id. at 547.
169. Id. at 548.
170. Id. (adding that “police may not make Terry-stops merely on the pretext of a minor
traffic violation” (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 710–11 (11th Cir.
1986))).
171. Id. at 549. But see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996) (rejecting
the proposed ‘would have test,’ stating “[b]ut although framed in empirical terms, this
approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations”).
172. See Morocco, 393 S.E.2d at 548; see also State v. Hunter, 420 S.E.2d 700, 703 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1992) (providing that “[a] stop is invalid if it seeks to use a ‘pretext
concealing an investigatory motive’ on part of the police” and “the question is
whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the defendant for being illegally
parked in a rest area, not whether an officer could have done so” (quoting State v.
Phifer, 254 S.E.2d 586, 589 (N.C. 1979))).
173. See State v. McClendon, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999).
174. Id. at 130.
175. Id.
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experience in drug investigations, it was common for drug traffickers
to use a decoy vehicle to effectuate their offense.176 In challenging
the validity of this stop, McClendon argued that the speeding
violation was a pretext for the stop.177 He argued that the standard
set forth in Morocco should apply—that a reasonable police officer
would not have stopped his vehicle for only going seven miles per
hour over the speed limit.178
McClendon also anticipated that Whren may influence the North
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision.179 Consequently, in his petition,
he argued that the North Carolina Supreme Court should refuse to
apply Whren, consistent with its earlier determinations that it was
free to interpret its own constitution to afford extra protections.180 He
also argued that if the court followed Whren, “there will be little
practical means of preventing, or even discouraging, law enforcement
officers from using discriminatory pretextual motives against law
abiding Black and Hispanic motorists in the State of North
Carolina.”181
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected McClendon’s
argument and adopted the Whren decision.182 Recognizing that it is
free to interpret its own constitution independently from the federal
constitution, the court determined the “reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Whren to be compelling.”183 Making no reference of the test
set-forth in Morocco, the North Carolina Supreme Court determined
that “for situations arising under our state Constitution, we hold that
an objective standard, rather than a subjective standard, must be
applied to determine the reasonableness of police action related to
probable cause.”184
After McClendon, North Carolina drivers were not protected from
the U.S. Supreme Court framework allowing for pretextual traffic
stops so long as there was probable cause of a traffic violation.185
But much like Whren, McClendon left open the possibility that police
officers may not make pretextual stops based on reasonable suspicion

176. See Defendant-Appellant’s New Brief at 28, State v. McClendon, 517 S.E.2d 128
(N.C. 1999) (No. 392A98).
177. McClendon, 517 S.E.2d at 132.
178. See Defendant-Appellant’s New Brief, supra note 176, at 34–35.
179. See id. at 22.
180. Id. at 26–27; McClendon, 517 S.E.2d at 132.
181. Defendant-Appellant’s New Brief, supra note 176, at 33.
182. McClendon, 517 S.E.2d at 132.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 131–32.
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of a traffic violation.186 The North Carolina Supreme Court appeared
to take a more restrictive view on this issue than the federal
circuits.187 In State v. Ivey, a police officer stopped Ivey after he
observed Ivey make a right hand turn without using a turn signal;
however, the traffic code in question only prohibited right hand turns
without a signal when “any other vehicle may be affected by such
movement . . . .”188 The Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded
that the police officer lacked sufficient probable cause to stop Ivey’s
vehicle because there was no indication that another vehicle would
have been affected by the turn.189
In its decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that
Whren was binding upon it, but also acknowledged Ivey’s race may
have played a role in the stop.190 The court never contemplated that
the stop could have been based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion
that the turn could have impacted another driver, but instead focused
on whether there was probable cause to believe Ivey’s actions
violated the traffic code.191 In determining whether probable cause
existed, the court considered whether a “reasonable [police] officer
would have believed, under the circumstances of the stop,” that
Ivey’s actions affected another driver.192 Finding that no such
evidence existed, the court found there was not probable cause to
make the stop.193 By not analyzing whether the police officer had a
reasonable suspicion of the turn impacting another driver, the court
implicitly rejected the idea that under Whren, a police officer may
make a pretextual traffic stop so long as he or she had reasonable
suspicion of a traffic code violation. Instead, the court held the
police officers to a probable cause standard focusing on whether a
reasonable police officer would have had sufficient probable cause to

186. See id. at 132 (holding that “an objective standard, rather than a subjective standard,
must be applied to determine the reasonableness of police action related to probable
cause” with no mention of police action related to reasonable suspicion).
187. Compare supra notes 143–44, and accompanying text (discussing the federal circuit
courts’ holdings on this issue), with State v. Ivey, 633 S.E.2d 459, 461–62 (N.C.
2006), abrogated by State v. Styles, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 n.1 (N.C. 2008).
188. Ivey, 633 S.E.2d. at 460–61 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-154(a) (West
2016)).
189. See id. at 461–62.
190. Id. at 461.
191. See id. at 460–61.
192. Id. at 461.
193. Id. at 461–62.
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make the stop, somewhat returning to the standard set forth in
Morocco.194
Only two-years later, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court
appeared to overturn itself and instead adopted the U.S. Supreme
Court traffic stop framework in its entirety.195 In State v. Styles, the
North Carolina Supreme Court considered a traffic stop based on an
officer’s reasonable suspicion of a traffic code violation.196 Here, an
officer observed Styles change lanes without signaling.197 The
applicable North Carolina traffic code only prohibits changing lanes
without signaling if it will impact the safety of another vehicle.198
These facts were similar to Ivey where under a probable cause
standard, the stop was deemed unlawful as there was no evidence to
suggest a reasonable police officer would have determined the lane
change affected another driver.199 However, the court reconsidered
its ruling in Ivey.200 Relying on the federal circuit court cases
following Whren, the court held that “reasonable suspicion is the
necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic
violation was readily observed or merely suspected.”201
Additionally, the court in Styles examined whether reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity alone is enough to warrant a traffic

194. Id.; see also State v. Morocco, 393 S.E.2d 545, 548 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (“In
determining the traffic stop was pretextual, the trial court should look at what a
reasonable officer would do rather than what an officer validly could do.”).
195. See State v. Styles, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 & n.1 (N.C. 2008).
196. Id. at 441.
197. Id. at 439.
198. Id. at 441 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-154(a) (West 2016)).
199. See Ivey, 633 S.E.2d at 461 (“The record in the case sub judice simply does not
support a finding of probable case. The record does not indicate that any other
vehicle or any pedestrian was, or might have been, affected by the turn.”). But c.f.
Styles, 665 S.E.2d at 441 (“[I]t is clear that changing lanes immediately in front of
another vehicle may affect the operation of the trailing vehicle. Officer Jones’
observation of defendant’s traffic violation gave him the required reasonable
suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle.”).
200. Styles, 665 S.E.2d at 440, 440 n.1. But see id. at 446–47 (Brady, J., dissenting)
(“Rather than rely upon the controlling authority of this Court’s prior decisions, the
majority has sought out non-authoritative opinions of federal circuit courts with which
to justify its departure from our case law. . . . We have no need to resort to decisions
of lower federal courts when this Court’s precedent speaks directly and clearly on the
issue. . . . [T]he majority’s analysis stands upon cases that perpetuate a faulty reading
of a Supreme Court of the United States opinion. The better course of action would
have been to simply follow this Court’s precedent in Ivey.” (footnote omitted)).
201. Id. at 440.
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stop.202 After citing several U.S. Supreme Court cases to support
traffic stops based solely on reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed that
“[t]his Court requires that ‘[t]he stop . . . be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by
his experience and training.’”203
Thus, while North Carolina had the constitutional means and a
historical need to interpret its constitution to protect black drivers, it
failed to do so.204 As a result, North Carolina black drivers are
subject to the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework that allows police
officers to follow vehicles based on racial bias until there is probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic code violation or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the traffic stop.205

202. Id. at 439. See also id. at 447 (Brady, J., dissenting) (“The State is correct that in
many situations all that would be required to seize a vehicle and its occupants would
be a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”).
203. Id. at 439 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting State v. Watkins, 446
S.E.2d 67, 70 (N.C. 1994)) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989);
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)).
204. See id. at 445–46 (Brady, J., dissenting).
205. See, e.g., State v. Foreman, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (N.C. 2000) (holding that an officer
had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on the officer observing a “quick left
turn” away from a DWI checkpoint at the “precise point where the driver” would
become aware of its presence); State v. McRae, 691 S.E.2d 56, 59 (N.C. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that an unsignaled lane change on a road with “medium” traffic and
executed a short distance in front of police constituted sufficient reasonable suspicion
for a traffic stop); State v. Blackwell, No. COA10-132, 2010 WL 5135877, at *6
(N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010) (holding that making two lane changes without signaling
and then positioning the vehicle between two vehicles already in close proximity
supported reasonable suspicion to make the stop); State v. Watkins, 725 S.E.2d 400,
403–04 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that changing lanes in heavy traffic was
sufficient reasonable suspicion to make a stop); State v. Jones, 813 S.E.2d 668, 672
(N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that a police officer’s observation of a single instance
of a vehicle crossing the double yellow centerline constituted reasonable suspicion to
make the traffic stop); State v. Johnson, 803 S.E.2d 137, 140–41 (N.C. 2017) (holding
that an officer’s stop of a driver for driving at an unsafe speed given the weather and
conditions was permissible even if the officer did not actually observe the speeding);
State v. Sutton, 817 S.E.2d 211, 212, 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that a police
officer’s observation of a truck crossing about one inch over the double yellow lines
on a curvy road is sufficient reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop).
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D. Making the Stop and the Black Experience
The U.S. Supreme Court and the North Carolina courts share a
common framework governing when police officers may make a
stop.206 To these courts, the framework is seemingly objective–so
long as an officer has reasonable suspicion or probable cause of
either a traffic code violation or criminal activity, he or she may
make the stop.207 The objective basis for the stop—probable cause or
reasonable suspicion—should then render the subjective intent of the
police officer irrelevant.208 At no point in this framework do the
courts consider the driver; rather, the drivers’ actions are viewed
completely through the lens of the police officer’s perceptions.209
Although the courts perpetuate that this framework is objective in
nature, it in fact relies heavily on the subjective beliefs and
experiences of the individual police officer.210 The consequence of
this subjectivity is severe on black drivers as the framework renders
their subjective beliefs to be irrelevant, but these subjective beliefs
may result in behavior that police officers find to support probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.211 This conflict then results in
increased traffic stops for black drivers.212
The underlying premise of Whren allows for the police officer’s
subjective beliefs and biases to initiate the traffic stop.213 An officer
on patrol who sees a black driver and believes for whatever reason
that the driver may be engaged in criminal activity—even if this
hunch is based on explicit racism—may then follow the driver until
that driver commits a traffic code violation.214 The officer is free to
then use that traffic code violation as a pretext for his or her racial

206. See Styles, 665 S.E.2d at 440.
207. See supra Sections I.A–C.
208. See Styles, 665 S.E.2d at 444 (Brady, J., dissenting) (citing Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 811–19 (1996)).
209. See id. at 439.
210. See id.
211. See ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 107–08.
212. See id.
213. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 812 (“Not only have we never held, outside the context of
inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates
objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly
held and asserted the contrary.”); see also Katz, supra note 74, at 1421 (“The Court’s
holding in Whren merely solidified a trend in United States jurisprudence toward
ignoring police officers’ racial biases, admitted or otherwise.”).
214. See Driving While Black, supra note 26, at 560 (“African-Americans and Hispanics
are the targets of choice for law enforcement.”).
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bias in making the stop.215 This standard was quickly viewed as a
victory for law enforcement.216 Police Chief magazine covered
Whren immediately and declared that it “preserve[s] officers’ ability
to use traffic stops to uncover other criminal activities,”217 and a
highway patrol training officer declared, “After Whren the game was
over. We won.”218
If law enforcement “won” as a result of Whren, then black drivers
lost. This framework legitimized the random targeting of black
drivers by law enforcement.219 Black drivers now had to live with the
constant threat of being targeted by law enforcement.220 While
Whren also allowed such conduct with white drivers, black drivers
carry the burden and stigma of pretext stops.221 It is reasonable to
expect that the constant scrutiny by police officers would lead to
mistrust, fear, and nervousness by those who are consistently
followed.222 In turn, it is also reasonable to believe that this
nervousness may impact how drivers operate their vehicles once they
observe a police vehicle following them.223
The framework’s supposed check on this initial subjective intent of
the police officer is that the officer must still have probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to make the stop.224 However, both probable
215. See Katz, supra note 74, at 1420 (“The Court’s holding in Whren institutionalizes
pretextual stops and arrests.”).
216. See EPP ET AL., supra note 51, at 35.
217. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roy Caldwell Kime, U.S. Supreme Court Rules on
Asset Forfeiture and Traffic Stop Evidence, POLICE CHIEF, Aug. 1996, at 10, 10).
218. Id. (quoting Gary Webb, DWB, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 128).
219. See Driving While Black, supra note 26, at 560 (“[W]hatever their motivation, viewed
as a whole, pretextual stops will be used against African-Americans and Hispanics in
percentages wildly out of proportion to their numbers in the driving population.”);
Katz, supra note 74, at 1416 (“The Supreme Court has turned its back on this [black]
population and has eliminated meaningful Fourth Amendment review of what
happens on the streets and highways . . . .”).
220. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 108–09.
221. See generally EPP ET AL., supra note 51, at 150 (“Police stops are a great unifier and
divider in American society. . . . On the one side are people for whom police stops
are the signal form of surveillance and legalized racial subordination. This group is
populated largely by African Americans and other racial minorities.”).
222. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 12–13; EPP ET AL., supra note 51, at 77–
78; Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of
Citizen Perceptions, 83 SOC. FORCES 1009, 1017–19 (2005) (revealing that personal
experiences with police officers significantly increases perceptions of biased policing
for blacks and that vicarious experiences with police officers with regards to prejudice
and profiling also increases perceptions of biased policing for blacks).
223. See generally EPP ET AL., supra note 51, at 47, 53–54.
224. See supra Sections I.A–C.
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cause and reasonable suspicion are on-site determinations made by
the police officer based on his or her personal experience and
perceptions.225 Consider probable cause. The Supreme Court has
held and the North Carolina courts have adopted, that “probable
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”226 Further, it “does
not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.”227 And these
probabilities “are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.”228 This standard allows for law
enforcement officers to formulate “certain common-sense
conclusions about human behavior” and “the evidence thus collected
must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement.”229 Thus, the probable cause standard, which supports
the objective-nature of the traffic stop framework, rests heavily upon
the common sense conclusions made by the police officer.230
Reasonable suspicion affords a similar amount of discretion to
police officers’ subjective interpretations of human behavior.231 The
U.S. Supreme Court and North Carolina Supreme Court have both
found that a stop predicated upon reasonable suspicion must be
225. See Katz, supra note 74, at 1413, 1416, 1443–44 (describing the probable cause and
reasonable suspicion requirements for traffic stops).
226. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983) (citations omitted). “Probable cause
exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of
which they had reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being
committed.” State v. Zuniga, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (N.C. 1984) (alterations in
original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)). See also
State v. Allman, 794 S.E.2d 301, 303 (N.C. 2016) (“[T]he probable cause analysis
under the federal and state constitutions is identical.”); State v. Earhart, 516 S.E.2d
883, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
227. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (citation omitted).
228. Id. (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175).
229. Id. at 231–32 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). See also
Allman, 794 S.E.2d at 303 (“To determine whether probable cause exists under the
totality of the circumstances, a magistrate may draw ‘[r]easonable inferences from the
available observations.’” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Riggs, 400 S.E.2d
429, 434 (N.C. 1991))).
230. See generally District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (“Probable
cause ‘is not a high bar.’” (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014));
State v. Williams, 333 S.E.2d 708, 713 (N.C. 1985) (defining probable cause as
“those facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge and of which he had
reasonably trustworthy information which are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense”).
231. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
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supported by “some minimal level of objective justification . . . .”232
To meet this standard, both courts require that “[t]he stop must be
based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational
inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a
reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and
training.”233 Again, this standard does not consider the subjective
beliefs of the person stopped, but rather focuses on inferences made
by the police officer on his or her personal experience.234 It allows
police officers to take innocent behavior, potentially spurred by
subjective fears, and render it suspicious based on their own personal
experiences and training.235 Consequently, behaviors such as
dramatically lowering one’s speed,236 nervousness,237 presence in a
known high crime area,238 unprovoked flight,239 and evasive
232. Id. (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217
(1984)); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (“The officer
must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
“hunch”’ of criminal activity’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968))); State
v. McClendon, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999) (“In order to further detain a person
after lawfully stopping him, an officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.”).
233. State v. Watkins, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (N.C. 1994) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22);
see also State v. Otto, 726 S.E.2d 824, 827–28 (N.C. 2012) (“Both the United States
and North Carolina Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”). This same standard—reasonable suspicion—applies under the North
Carolina constitution. Otto, 726 S.E.2d at 827–28.
234. See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text.
235. See generally Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9 (providing that “there could, of course, be
circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot.” (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980))).
See, e.g., Watkins, 446 S.E.2d at 69–70.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 270 (2002) (finding that an
individual lowering his speed from about 50–55 to 25–30 miles per hour after seeing
law enforcement could be considered as part of the reasonable suspicion analysis).
237. See, e.g., McClendon, 517 S.E.2d at 134 (“[N]ervousness is an appropriate factor to
consider when determining whether a basis for a reasonable suspicion exists.”); State
v. Jackson, 681 S.E.2d 492, 494–95 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that observing a
vehicle braking on the highway, the passengers tensing up when the police officer
drove by, and one of the passengers putting on a hood, possibly to obstruct his
identity, all contributed to sufficient reasonable suspicion for law enforcement to stop
the vehicle).
238. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[T]he fact that the stop occurred in a
‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry
analysis.” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972))). See, e.g., State
v. Jackson, 772 S.E.2d 847, 850 (N.C. 2015) (finding that it is relevant when
determining reasonable suspicion whether the defendant was walking in a high crime
area when stopped).
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behavior240 may all contribute to police officers’ reasonable suspicion
determinations.
The result of this framework is that black drivers are much more
likely to be stopped than white drivers.241 For example, imagine a
black driver who has been repeatedly and lawfully followed by police
officers. On any given night, the driver may see the police behind
her and become either nervous or fearful about the repeated
following. The police officer may very well be targeting her just
because she is black. Her fear and nervousness may lead the driver
to lower her speed, maybe make a quick turn to try to “lose the police
officer,” or somewhat increase her speed in accordance with the
speed limit. Assume too that the driver may not live in the best part
of town or may be commuting through a high crime area on the way
home. The police officer following her may consider all these
innocent factors that are mostly a response to the driver’s
nervousness or anger at being followed to believe there is reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle. Or, perhaps the same driver became
nervous or fearful at the sight of the police officer following her and
this impacted her driving. She nervously changed lanes without
signaling or drifted slightly over the yellow line. Such conduct
would then afford the police officer either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that she committed a traffic violation and to
stop the vehicle.242
When stopped by the police officer, the framework established by
the U.S. Supreme Court and accepted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court precludes her from arguing the stop was a pretext for the
officer’s racial bias, that a reasonable police officer would not have
stopped her based on those facts, or that her personal experiences
with police officers impacted her driving. Instead, so long as the

239. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[I]t was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of
heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officer’s suspicion, but his unprovoked
flight upon noticing the police.”); see also, e.g., State v. Griffin, 749 S.E.2d 444, 446–
47 (N.C. 2013) (finding that a legal turn made to avoid a law enforcement checkpoint
is comparable to unprovoked flight and may considered as part of the reasonable
suspicion analysis).
240. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“Our cases have also recognized that nervous,
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” (citing
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8–9)); State v. Foreman, 527
S.E.2d 921, 922–23 (N.C. 2000) (finding that a driver’s evasive maneuvers in
approaching a DUI checkpoint was sufficient reasonable suspicion to make a stop).
241. See supra notes 206–21 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 226–35 and accompanying text.
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police officer’s subjective observations support a seemingly objective
basis for the stop, the stop was permissible.243
II. FROM TRAFFIC STOP TO VEHICLE SEARCH—BRINGING
IN THE DRUG-SNIFFING DOG
Black drivers are not only stopped by police officers at a
disproportional rate but their vehicles are searched pursuant to these
stops at a disproportional rate.244 In North Carolina alone, over a
twenty-year period, black drivers were searched nearly twice as often
as white drivers.245 This section discusses how police officers
transition from a traffic based stop to conducting an investigatory
search of the vehicle. Such a transition is meaningful, as in North
Carolina, when the stop becomes investigatory in nature, black
drivers face a 115% increased chance of a search, compared to
whites.246
While police officers have broad discretion in making the stop,
they are somewhat more limited in how they conduct the stop.247
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[a] seizure for a traffic
violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.”248 As
traffic stops are “more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than
to a formal arrest[,]”249 the “tolerable duration of police inquiries in
the traffic-stop [sic] context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.”250
Under these restrictions, when police officers stop a vehicle, they are
limited in scope and time to investigating the reason for the stop.251
For example, if they stop a driver for speeding, they are limited to
investigating the driver for speeding, not for whether the driver
possesses illegal drugs.252
Nonetheless, traffic stops made by police officers based upon either
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of only a traffic code
violation may still result in a search of the vehicle—if the police

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See supra notes 225–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 85.
Id.
See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015).
Id. at 1614.
Id. (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998)).
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
Id.
See id.
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officers can establish probable cause of additional wrongdoing.253
The Supreme Court has long held that the Fourth Amendment does
not require a search warrant when law enforcement has probable
cause to believe evidence of wrongdoing is present in a vehicle.254
This approach extends to anywhere in the vehicle where the evidence
of criminal activity may be.255 Consequently, police officers may
transition from a traffic stop to an investigatory stop in order to
conduct a search of the vehicle by developing probable cause of
criminal activity.256
One way that police officers may develop probable cause of
criminal activity is through a drug-sniffing dog.257 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that a well-trained police dog’s “alert” as to
the presence of contraband is sufficient to establish probable cause to
search a vehicle.258 The availability of a drug-sniffing dog to
transition a traffic stop into an investigatory stop has led police
officers to refer to drug-sniffing dogs as “probable cause on four
legs[,]”259 with officers only needing an alert from a drug-sniffing
dog to justify a search of the entire vehicle.260
253. State v. Kincaid, 555 S.E.2d 294, 299–300 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“A search of a
vehicle on a public roadway or public vehicular area is properly conducted without a
warrant as long as probable cause exists for the search.” (quoting State v. Earhart, 516
S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999))).
254. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151–53 (1925) (establishing an exception
to the warrant requirement for moving vehicles, “where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
623–24 (1886) (discussing historical interpretations of permissible searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
255. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe
contraband or evidence is contained.”); State v. McDaniels, 405 S.E.2d 358, 366
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (“[A] police officer may now search a closed container found in
a vehicle, where the officer has the suspect’s general consent to search and the officer
might reasonably believe the container holds the object of the search.”).
256. See Kincaid, 555 S.E.2d at 297–98.
257. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013).
258. Id. at 247–48 (“If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog
performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that
showing, then the court should find probable cause.”). North Carolina has also
accepted this proposition. See State v. Washburn, 685 S.E.2d 555, 560 (N.C. Ct. App.
2009) (“[A] positive alert for drugs by a specially trained drug dog gives probable
cause to search the area or item where the dog alerts.”).
259. Martin Kaste, Eliminating Police Bias When Handling Drug-Sniffing Dogs, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/20/563889510/
preventing-police-bias-when-handling-dogs-that-bite.
260. Id.
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But when may officers use the drug-sniffing dog during the course
of a routine traffic stop? What level of suspicion is required, if any?
This section focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework
regarding the use of drug dogs to develop sufficient probable cause to
support a search of a vehicle stopped for a traffic code violation.261 It
focuses on the initial decision to call in the drug dog and the police
officers’ ability to extend the traffic stop beyond its initial purpose to
await the drug dog’s arrival.262 After examining U.S. Supreme
Court’s framework and North Carolina’s approach, this section
analyzes how this framework conflicts with the black experience and
how this conflict results in black drivers being disproportionately
searched as part of their traffic stop.263
A. Calling in the Drug Dog and the U.S. Supreme Court—No
Suspicion Required
An Illinois state trooper stopped Roy Caballes for driving seventyone miles per hour on a portion of the interstate where the speed limit
was sixty-five miles per hour.264 The trooper called-in the stop and
asked for a check of Caballes’ license plates.265 A different trooper
heard the call and immediately went to the stop equipped with his
drug-sniffing dog.266 Prior to the drug dog arriving, the on-site
trooper indicated to Caballes that he was going to give him a warning
ticket.267 Before the trooper completed the warning ticket, the other
trooper and the drug-sniffing dog arrived.268 The trooper walked the
dog around Caballes’ vehicle, and the dog alerted at the trunk.269 A
subsequent probable cause search of the trunk found marijuana.270
Caballes challenged the lawfulness of the search, and the Illinois
Supreme Court seemed to agree.271 The Illinois Supreme Court
determined that “there were no specific and articulable facts to
support the use of a canine sniff”272 and that the use of the dog sniff

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Sections II.C–D.
See infra Section II.E.
Brief for the Respondent at 7, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No. 03-923).
Id. at 2.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 264, at 2.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 264, at 3.
See id.
See People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 202 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 405.
Id. at 204 (citing People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 279–80 (Ill. 2002)).
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“impermissibly broadened the scope of the traffic stop.”273 After
Illinois petitioned on writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Caballes argued that “[t]he fact that the police had probable cause to
stop [him] for speeding did not authorize them to undertake an
investigatory dog sniff, designed solely to prospect for possible
evidence of an unrelated offense.”274 The Illinois Supreme Court275
and Caballes276 were willing to concede that reasonable suspicion
was sufficient to use a drug dog as part of a routine traffic stop, but
Illinois argued no level of suspicion was required.277
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Illinois. The Court framed its
analysis around the principle that “conducting a dog sniff would not
change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and
otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog sniff itself
infringed respondent’s constitutionally protected interest in
privacy.”278 Looking to prior cases involving drug dogs, the Court
determined that allowing a dog to sniff around the outside of a
vehicle does not implicate legitimate privacy interests and hence is
not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.279 Consequently, the
Court held that no suspicion was required to justify using a drug
detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a stop for a traffic code
violation.280
B. Calling in the Drug Dog and North Carolina—No Suspicion
Required
In Caballes, the Illinois Supreme Court found that reasonable
suspicion was necessary to use a drug-sniffing dog as part of a
routine traffic stop, but the U.S. Supreme Court overturned that
decision.281 The U.S. Supreme Court was able to do so, however,
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 264, at 6.
See Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 202.
See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 264, at 21.
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
Id. at 408.
See id. at 408–09 (first citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000);
then citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1984); and then citing
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). In United States v. Place, the
Court stated that it will treat a canine sniff by a well-trained drug dog as “sui generis”
because it “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item”
and “does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden . . . .”
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
280. See Caballes, 453 U.S. at 409.
281. See People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (“[A]
canine sniff was performed without ‘specific and articulable facts’ to support its use,
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because the Illinois Supreme Court based its holding on its reading of
the U.S. Constitution, not on Illinois’ constitution.282 Thus, the
possibility of traffic stop federalism remains in place for requiring
some level of suspicion for using a drug-sniffing dog.283
Once again, though, North Carolina has elected to proceed in
lockstep agreement with the U.S. Supreme Court. Prior to Caballes,
the North Carolina courts also required reasonable suspicion to
utilize a drug dog as part of a routine traffic stop.284 In
North
Carolina v. Branch I, Branch was stopped at a license and
registration checkpoint.285 While she was stopped, a police officer
walked a drug-sniffing dog around Branch’s vehicle.286 The dog
alerted and a probable cause search of Branch’s vehicle found
marijuana stems and butts in the vehicle’s ashtray and a small
amount of marijuana in her purse located in the vehicle.287
Branch challenged the use of the drug dog and the North Carolina
Court of Appeals agreed with her. The Court of Appeals held that “a

282.

283.

284.
285.
286.
287.

unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.”).
But see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (“A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful
traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision did not explicitly provide whether the drug dog
sniff triggered the Fourth Amendment or the Illinois constitution; instead, the Illinois
Supreme Court based its decision on People v. Cox, which had previously required
‘specific and articulable facts’ to justify the calling of a police dog. See People v.
Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 278, 281 (Ill. 2002), overruled by People v. Bew, 886 N.E.2d
1002 (Ill. 2008). In Cox, the Illinois Supreme Court based its holding on the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution with no reference made to the Illinois
constitution. Id. at 278. See also O’NEILL, supra note 42, at 761 (“In our federal
system, the state’s highest court has every right to find that the Illinois Constitution
offers more protection to Illinois citizens than does the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. . . . Instead, the court could have found that Article I, Section 6
of the Illinois Constitution provides increased protection to Illinois drivers and
passengers.”).
See, e.g., People v. Devone, 931 N.E.2d 70, 74 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that a canine
drug sniff of the exterior of a vehicle constitutes a search under the New York
constitution, and law enforcement may only utilize a drug sniff of a vehicle if
supported by “founded suspicion,” which is a lesser standard than reasonable
suspicion).
State v. Falana, 501 S.E.2d 358, 360 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a drug sniff
of a vehicle is not a search, but a reasonable and articulable suspicion is required
before law enforcement can use a drug sniff).
State v. Branch (Branch I), 591 S.E.2d 923, 924 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 546
U.S. 931.
Id.
Id.
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reasonable and articulable suspicion is required before a dog sniff,
even though it is not a search . . . .”288 After the North Carolina
Supreme Court denied review of this holding,289 the state submitted a
petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was
granted.290 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’
decision and remanded it back to the court for consideration in light
of Caballes.291
On remand, the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not have to
follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Caballes. While the Court
of Appeals was bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals in Branch II could have
interpreted the North Carolina constitution’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures as requiring reasonable suspicion
to justify the use of a drug-sniffing dog—just as it had earlier.292
Instead, the Court of Appeals made no reference to the North
Carolina constitution and applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Caballes to Branch.293 As such, the Court of Appeals held that
“officers need no additional assessment under the Fourth Amendment
before walking a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of that
individual’s vehicle.”294 Once again, the North Carolina courts had
an opportunity to expand the rights of its citizens through a broader
interpretation of its constitution—consistent with their prior
holdings—but refused to do so in light of contrary U.S. Supreme
Court decisions.
C. Waiting for the Drug Dog and Reasonable Suspicion
The U.S. Supreme Court’s framework allows for police officers to
request and use a drug dog to sniff around a vehicle stopped pursuant
to a routine traffic stop without any suspicion of additional
wrongdoing.295 But what if the drug-sniffing dog is late to arrive?
Can police officers prolong the traffic stop beyond its completion to
conduct a dog drug-sniff? As stated earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court
considers traffic stops to be relatively brief encounters that may “last

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 926.
State v. Branch, 595 S.E.2d 437 (N.C. 2004) (mem.).
North Carolina v. Branch, 546 U.S. 931 (2005) (mem.).
Id.
See, e.g., State v. Falana, 501 S.E.2d 358, 360 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Branch I, 591
S.E.2d at 927.
293. See State v. Branch (Branch II), 627 S.E.2d 506, 508–09 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
294. Id. at 509.
295. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005).
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no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.”296 The
authority for the stop “thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”297
While officers may engage in unrelated investigations during the
course of the traffic stop, such as a utilizing a drug-sniffing dog,
these investigations may not “lengthen the roadside detention.”298
In Rodriguez v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether extending a traffic stop for a reasonable amount of time to
use the drug-sniffing dog unduly lengthened the “roadside
detention.”299 The state advocated a de minimis exception to the
general prohibition against extending a traffic stop beyond its initial
purpose.300 It argued that the government’s “strong interest in
interdicting the flow of illegal drugs along the nation’s highways,”
outweighed the de minimis additional instruction of requiring a
driver, already stopped, to remain pulled over while awaiting the
drug-sniffing dog.301 To further this argument, the government set
forth that the police officer “may ‘incremental[ly]’ prolong a stop to
conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in
pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall
duration of the stop remains reasonable . . . .”302
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to establish the de minimis
exception, proposed by the state in the case, of prolonging traffic
stops to use a drug-sniffing dog.303 Instead, the Court found that the
government did not have a general safety interest in the case of drug
trafficking that would outweigh the additional intrusion and that
police officers should always conduct traffic stops diligently.304 As
such, the Court held that police officers could only extend traffic
stops beyond their initial purpose if they have reasonable suspicion to
do so.305 Thus, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s framework, no
suspicion is required to use a drug-sniffing dog during a routine

296. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (alteration in original).
297. Id. at 1614 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).
298. Id. (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327–28 (2009); Caballes, 543 U.S. at
408).
299. Id. at 1612, 1614.
300. Id. at 1616.
301. Id. at 1615 (quoting United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643,
649 (1999)).
302. Id. at 1616 (alteration in original).
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 1615.
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traffic stop, but reasonable suspicion is required if the sniff will
prolong the stop beyond its initial purpose.306
D. Waiting for the Drug Dog and Reasonable Suspicion in North
Carolina
In terms of requiring reasonable suspicion for extending a stop in
anticipation of a drug dog sniff, North Carolina has had a somewhat
scattered approach.
At first, North Carolina courts adhered
somewhat strictly to a requirement of reasonable suspicion in
prolonging the stop to use a drug-sniffing dog.307 However, in 2012
the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Brimmer established
a de minimis exception similar to the one advocated for by the
government in Rodriguez.308 Only two years following Brimmer, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals again considered the issue.309 In
State v. Cottrell, the North Carolina Court of Appeals limited the de
minimis exception to the facts of Brimmer, specifically to instances
“in which a drug-sniffing dog is available at the scene of the traffic
stop prior to completion of the purpose of the stop.”310 The Court of
Appeals noted that it refused to extend the de minimis exception to
situations where a drug dog has not “already been called to the scene
prior to completion of the lawful stop.”311 Instead, the Court of
Appeals committed itself to requiring reasonable suspicion in those
situations.312 Once the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rodriguez,
however, the North Carolina courts again returned to requiring
reasonable suspicion for all situations where police officers
prolonged the stop for a drug sniff. 313
306. See id. at 1616.
307. See, e.g., State v. Euceda-Valle, 641 S.E.2d 858, 863 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“[I]n
order to further detain a suspect from the time the warning ticket is issued until the
time the canine unit arrives, there must be ‘reasonable suspicion, based on specific
and articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.’” (quoting State v. McClendon,
517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999))); State v. Fisher, 725 S.E.2d 40, 44 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012) (“[R]easonable suspicion must exist at the moment the officer decides to detain
the defendant beyond the issuing of the citation . . . .”); State v. Bell, 576 S.E.2d 695,
698 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that reasonable suspicion must be presented once
the officer decides to hold the driver past the issuing of the citation).
308. State v. Brimmer, 653 S.E.2d 196, 199–200 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (adopting rule that
if the traffic stop is prolonged for a short period of time in order to complete a drug
sniff, the intrusion is considered de minimis); see also supra notes 299–302 and
accompanying text.
309. See State v. Cottrell, 760 S.E.2d 274, 275–76 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
310. Id. at 283.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 285.
313. State v. Warren, 775 S.E.2d 362, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
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After the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, the North Carolina courts
were somewhat limited in exercising traffic stop federalism.314 As
Rodriguez directly rejected the de minimis exception allowed by the
North Carolina courts in limited instances, the U.S. Supreme Court
arguably provided drivers with more constitutional rights—requiring
some level of individualized suspicion before police officers could
prolong the stop. Consequently, the North Carolina courts were
limited in maintaining their de minimis exception and the North
Carolina Court of Appeals correctly identified this limitation when it
held that “the holdings in these cases to the extent that they apply the
de minimis rule have been overruled by Rodriguez.”315
Although the North Carolina courts were bound by the U.S.
Supreme Court to require some level of suspicion to prolong a traffic
stop to wait for a drug dog, the North Carolina court did have a
choice—what level of suspicion to require. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that reasonable suspicion was required,316 but the North Carolina
courts could have required the higher level of suspicion—probable
cause. Instead, the North Carolina courts affirmed its earlier
commitment to reasonable suspicion and emphasized that
“reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance
of the evidence. Only some minimal level of objective justification is
required.”317 They again committed the initial determination of
reasonable suspicion to the on-sight police officer, requiring that
courts “must examine both the facts known to the officer at the time
he decided to approach the defendant and the rational inferences that
may be drawn from those facts”318 and courts must “take into account
an officer’s training and experience.”319
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court’s traffic stop framework,
adopted by the North Carolina courts, allows for police officers to
transition from a routine traffic stop to an investigatory stop
involving a search of the vehicle through the use of a drug-sniffing
dog.320 With absolutely no suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing,
the police officers may utilize the drug-sniffing dog to potentially
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id.
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015).
Warren, 775 S.E.2d at 365 (quoting State v. Barnard, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (N.C.
2008)).
318. Id. at 365–66 (citing State v. Thompson, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779 (N.C. 1979)).
319. Id. (quoting State v. Willis, 481 S.E.2d 407, 410 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)).
320. See supra notes 295–98 and accompanying text.
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provide probable cause for a search of the vehicle.321 The one check
imposed by the Court on this practice is that police officers may not
prolong the stop beyond its initial objective to use the drug dog;322
however, they may still prolong the stop to use the drug-sniffing dog
if they develop reasonable suspicion, which again gives deference to
the police officer’s experience and personal knowledge.
E. The Drug-Sniffing Dog and the Black Experience
The framework created by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted by
the North Carolina courts again appears on its face to be objective in
nature. Police may utilize a drug dog for anyone—white or black—
without any suspicion so long as the drug dog does not prolong the
stop beyond its initial justification.323 If the police develop
reasonable suspicion–again a supposedly objective standard–they
may then prolong the stop beyond its initial justification to wait for
the arrival of the drug dog.324 Much like the initial stop framework,
this framework also refuses to consider the driver. A driver is
helpless when it comes to the decision of whether a drug dog will be
used and whether one is available. The officer has complete as to
whether to use a drug dog during the initial stop and it may be a
matter of luck as to whether a dog is available or arrives in the time it
takes the police officer to complete the initial justification of the
stop.325 Further, this framework once again fails to contemplate the
inherent coerciveness of a traffic stop, especially for a black driver.326
A black driver, impacted by the entirety of the black American
experience, may likely become extremely nervous when face-to-face
with a police officer while stopped on the side of the road.327 And it
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See supra notes 274–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 298–315 and accompanying text.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407–08 (2005).
See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015).
Cecil J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 315 (2005) (“The scope of the
Caballes decision is unreasonably broad and thus threatening to civil liberties,
because it opens the way for the police to conduct suspicionless drugs searches with
drug-sniffing dogs in any lawful traffic stop . . . .”).
326. See infra notes 327–32 and accompanying text.
327. See Eugene Scott, Only One-third of African Americans Say They Have Confidence in
the Police. Killings Like Alton Sterling’s Are Part of the Reason., WASH. POST: THE
FIX (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/03/27/
only-one-third-of-african-americans-say-they-have-confidence-in-the-police-killingslike-alton-sterlings-are-part-of-the-reason/ (quoting Rep. Cedric Richmond, “We must
all continue to work to bridge the divide between law enforcement and community.
Until this is done, many young black men and women will be forced to fear any
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is this nervousness, often coupled with other innocent behavior,
which then gives the police officer—based on his or her own
personal experiences and training—reasonable suspicion to prolong
the stop and potentially search the vehicle.328
The initial decision of whether to utilize a drug dog may provide
for the most subjectivity on the part of the police officer. By
requiring no suspicion, police officers need not justify why they
request a drug dog for some drivers but not for others.329
nonthreatening action they take could be met with certain death.”); see also Kevin
Hardy, Local Activist Group Says Video Shows Des Moines Officer Racially Profiling
2 Black Men, DES MOINES REG., https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/
crime-and-courts/2018/08/15/iowa-cci-traffic-stop-videos-show-evidence-raciallybiased-policing-des-moines-kyle-thies/1001324002/ (last updated Aug. 16, 2018, 7:10
PM).
328. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 817 S.E.2d 211, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (finding that a
driver’s confusion, quick talking, stuttering and mumbling, lack of eye contact,
extreme nervousness, and bloodshot and glassy eyes were, based on the training and
experience of the officer, sufficient indicia of reasonable suspicion to prolong the
stop); State v. Johnson, 783 S.E.2d 753, 763–64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that
the driver’s inability to answer basic questions, his changing of his story, the presence
of a vehicle’s computer system on the floorboard, and the driver appearing ‘very’
nervous—breathing heavily, neck veins pulsing—were sufficient grounds to prolong
the stop); State v. Warren, 775 S.E.2d 362, 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (finding that
reasonable suspicion is sufficient to prolong a stop based on the driver’s presence in a
high crime, high drug area, the driver had something in his mouth he wasn’t chewing,
and the driver denied being involved in drug activity “any longer,” when viewed
through the lens of the officer’s “six years of experience” and “specific training in
narcotics detection”); State v. Fisher, 725 S.E.2d 40, 44–45 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(finding that an overwhelming odor of air freshener and a driver’s nervousness
contributed to sufficient reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop); State v. Blackwell,
No. COA10-132, slip op. at 8–9 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010) (finding that a driver’s
nervousness and a can of air freshener in the car contributed to sufficient reasonable
suspicion “[w]hen . . . viewed in their totality and through the eyes of a reasonable,
cautious officer, guided by his experience and training”); State v. Euceda-Valle, 641
S.E.2d 858, 863–64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the driver’s extreme
nervousness, the smell of air freshener, and the driver’s refusal to make eye contact
was sufficient reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop); State v. Hernandez, 612
S.E.2d 420, 426–27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that reasonable suspicion is
sufficient to prolong stop based on driver’s extreme nervousness, refusal to make eye
contact, smell of air freshener, and conflicting stories from passengers and driver).
329. See generally Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending
the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV 735,
748–49 (2011) (“Caballes and Whren operate in tandem, allowing police to stop
virtually any motorist and, by the use of a drug dog, check the motorist’s car for drugs
at the whim of a police officer, even if a reasonable police officer would not have
stopped the car for such a trivial offense, or even if the real reason for the stop is not
the traffic violation but the race of the motorist.”).
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Consequently, a police officer who has a subjective belief that black
drivers are more likely to carry drugs in their vehicles than white
drivers may follow a black driver until the driver commits a traffic
code violation and then immediately request a drug-sniffing dog to
confirm the officer’s subjective hunch.330 The same police officer
may then never request the drug-sniffing dog when he stops a white
driver.331 At no point does the U.S. Supreme Court framework
provide protection to the driver, who sits at the mercy of the police
officer’s discretion and the availability of a drug-sniffing dog.332
The one protection afforded to drivers under the drug dog
framework is that police may not prolong the stop for the drug dog
absent reasonable suspicion.333 Again though, the determination of
reasonable suspicion is predicated in large part by the individual
police officer’s subjective beliefs and experiences without any
consideration of the driver.334 This reliance on reasonable suspicion
is especially problematic in the context of a traffic stop when the
vehicle is pulled over. Prior to being pulled over, a black driver may
become increasingly nervous when she sees a police vehicle
following her and her driving may be affected, but the encounter
becomes more coercive when the driver and police officer are faceto-face.335 The normal reaction for any driver is to become
330. See, e.g., Dan Hinkel & Joe Mahr, Tribune Analysis: Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Traffic
Stops Often Wrong, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
ct-xpm-2011-01-06-ct-met-canine-officers-20110105-story.html (quoting Virginia
Martinez, an attorney from the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, “We know that there is a level of racial profiling going on . . . . People of color
are just targets.”).
331. See, e.g., Racial Disparity in Consent Searches and Dog Sniff Searches, AM. C.L.
UNION ILL. (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/publications/racial-disparityconsent-searches-and-dog-sniff-searches (“Black motorists were 55% more likely
than white motorists to be subjected to a dog sniff. Yet white motorists were 14%
more likely than black motorists to be found with contraband during officer searches
performed in response to a dog alert.”).
332. The Court justified its ruling in Caballes on the premise that the drug dog sniffing the
outside of the vehicle on a public roadway was not a “search” for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005). In prior situations where the Court allowed
for Fourth Amendment searches without any individualized suspicions, such as
inventory searches, the Court did require that the search be performed consistent with
standardized police procedures to protect against pretextual searches. See Florida v.
Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
333. See discussion supra Section II.D.
334. See, e.g., supra note 327 and accompanying text.
335. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 448–49 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
vulnerability that an intrastate or interstate traveler experiences when confronted by
the police outside of his ‘own familiar territory’ surely aggravates the coercive quality
of such an encounter.”).
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apprehensive when stopped by the police.336 However, for a black
driver, potentially possessing a deep distrust and skepticism of police
officers, this nervousness is likely to be much greater than that of a
white driver.337
The nervousness of a black driver becomes especially relevant in
the determination of what exactly constitutes reasonable suspicion.
North Carolina courts have repeatedly held that innocent conduct,338
such as nervousness is a significant factor in determining whether an
officer could form a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot.339 As a result, North Carolina courts frequently couple
nervousness along with other seemingly innocent factors, such as the

336. See State v. Pearson, 498 S.E.2d 599, 601 (N.C. 1998) (stating that “[m]any people
become nervous when stopped by a state trooper”).
337. Several studies explore the difference in how whites and blacks perceive police
officers with the statistically significant common thread being that whites tend to see
and respond to police officers in a more favorable way than blacks. See generally
Patricia Y. Warren, The Continuing Significance of Race: An Analysis Across Two
Levels of Policing, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 1026, 1039 (2010) (providing that vicarious police
experiences—stories about police that people hear about from their friends and
family—reduce police legitimacy for black respondents and that perceptions of racial
profiling by black respondents significantly reduced trust in law enforcement); Ronald
Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct, 51 SOC.
PROBS. 305, 307 (2004) (“Contacts with the police tend to have stronger and longerlasting effects on the views of African Americans than whites. Blacks are more likely
to leave an encounter with police upset or angry, and they are also more likely to feel
that they have not received procedural justice from the officer, which lowers their
overall opinion of the police.” (citations omitted)); Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 222,
at 1017–18 (“[A] majority of blacks . . . believe that police in their city treat blacks
worse than whites. . . . A majority of blacks . . . believe[] that police provide ‘worse’
service to black neighborhoods. . . . [S]ignificant numbers of Hispanics and blacks,
but almost no whites report being ‘treated unfairly’ by police in their city specifically
because of their race.”).
338. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“Any one of these factors is not
by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But
we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion.”); State v. Johnson, 783
S.E.2d 753, 762 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that “context matters: actions that may
appear innocuous at a certain time or in a certain place may very well serve as a
harbinger of criminal activity under different circumstances” (quoting United States v.
Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336–37 (4th Cir. 2008))); State v. Fisher, 725 S.E.2d 40, 45
(N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“We recognize that several of the factors listed by the State in
this case can easily be construed as innocent behavior, but ‘[i]t must be rare indeed
that an officer observes behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent
interpretation.’” (quoting United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2d Cir. 1979))).
339. See Fisher, 725 S.E.2d at 501, 504.
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strong smell of an air freshener,340 to find sufficient reasonable
suspicion to prolong a stop pending the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog.
It is again a situation where innocent conduct becomes suspicion
because of the subjective beliefs of the police officer.341
This framework, built upon the subjective whims of a police officer
and a reasonable suspicion standard built on excessive nervousness,
conflicts with the black experience and results in black drivers being
disproportionately searched as part of their traffic stop.342 Consider
the hypothetical black driver from the earlier discussion on when
police officers may initiate a traffic stop.343 A police officer started
following a black driver based on his belief that black drivers are
generally engaged in drug use. The driver observed the police officer
following her and this made her nervous, which resulted in her
committing a traffic code violation. The police officer then had this
objective basis to make a stop. Believing that black drivers were
likely to engage in drug activity, he immediately called in the driver’s
license plates and requested a drug-sniffing dog. He approached the
vehicle and began the process of giving the driver a citation for the
traffic violation. The dog had still not arrived by the time he finished
writing the citation.
As the stop continued, the driver, who had been followed and
stopped by the police repeatedly before and was significantly
impacted by the Black Lives Matter movement,344 became
increasingly nervous about the interaction. She began sweating
profusely. When the officer asked her questions, she either mumbled
a response or gave short answers, hoping to end the stop. When the
officer asked her where she was coming from, she could not
340. See State v. Euceda-Valle, 641 S.E.2d 858, 863 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (holding “that
the trial court’s findings of fact support its legal conclusion that law enforcement had
a reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the exterior canine sniff of the vehicle.
Defendant was extremely nervous and refused to make eye contact with the officer.
In addition, there was smell of air freshener coming from the vehicle, and the vehicle
was not registered to the occupants.”); see also State v. Hernandez, 612 S.E.2d 420,
426–27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that reasonable suspicion was supported by
nervousness, lack of eye contact, conflicting statements, and strong odor of air
freshener in the vehicle).
341. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
343. See supra text accompanying note 334.
344. See Clare Foran, A Year of Black Lives Matter: As the Protest Movement Evolves,
Activists Face Pushback and Growing Pains, ATLANTIC (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/black-lives-matter/421839/; see also What
We Believe, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-webelieve/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
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remember due to her nervousness. The officer believed the totality of
these factors, especially her nervousness, were enough for reasonable
suspicion and kept her pulled over until a police dog arrived. The
police dog then sniffed around her car, alerted, and allowed the
police to search the vehicle.
When searched by the police officer, the framework established by
the U.S. Supreme Court and accepted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court precludes her from arguing that the only reason the officer
called for the police dog was because she was black or that he failed
to follow standard operating procedures. It also precludes her from
arguing that her nervousness should not be considered as a basis for
reasonable suspicion because she was not nervous because of the
contents of her car, but rather because of her fear or distrust of police
officers predicated upon historical and personal experiences with law
enforcement. Rather, a court will refuse to look at why the officer
requested the drug-sniffing dog and will give deference to the police
officer’s determination that her nervousness contributed to his
reasonable suspicion determination based on current standards.345
III. CONSENT-BASED SEARCHES
A North Carolina police officer stopped a vehicle in which Marlon
Bartlett, a black man, was a back seat passenger after the officer
suspected Bartlett had just participated in a drug transaction in a fast
food parking lot.346 After stopping the vehicle, five uniformed police
officers approached Bartlett, ordered him to show his hands, and
instructed him to exit the vehicle.347 Once outside the vehicle, one of
the officers asked Bartlett whether he would consent to a search of
his person.348 According to the officer, Bartlett responded, “[g]o
ahead,” at which point the officer conducted a search and discovered
a bag of heroin in Bartlett’s underwear.349
It seems absurd and counterintuitive that an individual who knows
he is in possession of heroin would then voluntarily consent to a
search of his person.350 A more reasonable explanation would
345. See supra notes 322–40 and accompanying text.
346. State v. Bartlett, 818 S.E.2d 710, 712–13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that the officer
pulled the vehicle’s driver over for reckless driving and speeding).
347. Id. at 713.
348. Id.
349. Id. (noting that Bartlett testified he never gave the officer consent to conduct a
search).
350. See Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 774 (2005) (arguing
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perhaps be that a black male, stopped on the side of the road by five
uniformed police officers, having been ordered to show his hands and
to exit the vehicle, would feel that he has no choice but to consent to
a search.351 Despite such apparent inherent coerciveness, consentbased searches “are part of the standard investigatory techniques of
law enforcement agencies.”352 These searches occur “on the
highway, or in a person’s home or office, and under informal and
unstructured conditions.”353 When performed on a highway, consentbased searches often involve both a search of a driver’s person and
their vehicle.354 Police officers asking for consent to search during a
routine traffic stop has become commonplace355 and are “now a
wholesale activity accompanying a great many traffic stops . . . .”356
In North Carolina, consent-based searches are the most common
type of search performed during a traffic stop.357 Of the nearly
700,000 vehicle searches performed by North Carolina law
enforcement officers over the past twenty years, over 304,678 of
those searches were based upon consent;358 amongst these vehicle
searches, consent was given by 141,190 black drivers as compared to
only 127,954 white drivers.359 If consent-based searches are the most
prevalent type of search, and if North Carolina black drivers provide

351.

352.
353.
354.
355.

356.
357.
358.
359.

that two individuals who consented to a search “is at once absurd, meaningless, and
irrelevant . . . . It is absurd because no outsider viewing the interaction would
conclude that the defendants voluntarily consented to a search when surrounded by
police at close quarters . . . .”).
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 47 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The police
officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the officer
lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a
reasonable person would not feel free to walk away while the officer continues to
address them.”).
State v. Smith, 488 S.E.2d 210, 213 (N.C. 1997) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1973)).
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231–32.
See, e.g., id. at 220 (stating that when the driver of the vehicle was pulled over, the
officer searched both his person and the vehicle).
See, e.g., State v. Ready, 565 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Neb. 1997) (quoting State v. Ready,
556 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996)) (acknowledging that an officer provided
that he routinely asked for consent to search when he made a traffic stop); United
States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 649 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that an officer
testified that he searches “97 percent of the cars [he] stop[s]”); State v. Retherford,
639 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (stating that an officer testified that he
requested to search 786 vehicles involved in traffic stops in a single year).
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.3(e) 539 (5th ed. 2012).
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 112–13.
Id. at 113.
Id.
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consent more often than white drivers, then how does North Carolina
law ensure that consent is voluntarily given?
North Carolina largely follows the framework established by the
U.S. Supreme Court.360 This section explores the framework
established by the U.S. Supreme Court—a framework that began as
subjective in nature, considering the suspect’s perception of the
circumstances, that gradually shifted towards a seemingly objective
standard focused instead on the individual police officer’s perception
of the circumstances.361 It subsequently examines North Carolina’s
acceptance of the approach and how this framework then clashes
with the black experience to result in more searches of black
drivers.362
A.

From Subjective to Objective—the U.S. Supreme Court and
Consent-Based Searches

The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the permissibility of a
consent-based search in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.363 A California
police officer stopped Bustamonte while on routine patrol at
approximately 2:40 a.m.364 He based the stop on the fact that one
headlight and the license plate light were out on the vehicle.365
Bustamonte was not the driver, but was rather located in the front
seat with one other individual and the driver.366 The police officer
asked the third individual in the front seat if he could search the
vehicle and he responded, “Sure, go ahead.”367 A subsequent search
of the vehicle found three stolen checks.368
At trial, Bustamonte challenged the validity of the consent given to
search, but the trial court found it was a valid search.369 The
California Court of Appeals found the consent to be valid based on
an earlier California Supreme Court standard: “[w]hether in a
particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given or

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See supra Section I.C.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Sections III.B–C.
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 219–20.
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was in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority, is a
question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances.”370
Subsequently, Bustamante successfully brought the case into
federal court, with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in his
favor by holding that “consent was a waiver of a person’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the State was under an
obligation to demonstrate, not only that the consent had been
uncoerced, but that it had been given with an understanding that it
could be freely and effectively withhold [sic].”371 Thus, on appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court was presented with two
interpretations of the validity of consent: one based on the totality of
the circumstances, and the other solely based on the subjective
understanding of the individual being questioned that consent could
be denied.372
The Court focused its decision by balancing the need and
legitimacy of consent-based searches for law enforcement purposes
and the requirement “that they be free from any aspect of official
coercion.”373 Based in part on this balancing, the Court rejected any
requirement that the suspect must be aware of his or her ability to
refuse consent.374 The Court highlighted that such a standard is too
subjective in nature, stating that “[a]ny defendant who was the
subject of a search authorized solely by his consent could effectively
frustrate the introduction . . . of the fruits of that search by simply
failing to testify that he in fact knew he could refuse consent.”375
Further, such a standard would feasibly require law enforcement to
notify the suspect of his or her right to refuse consent, which would
be “thoroughly impractical to impose” because the “circumstances
that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or be a
logical extension of . . . police questioning.”376
Although the Court rejected a purely subjective test—whether the
suspect knew of his or her right to refuse consent—the Court was
sympathetic to the potential coerciveness of a police encounter.377
The Court noted that the “possibility of unfair and even brutal police
370. Id. at 221 (quoting People v. Michael, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (Cal. 1955)); see also People
v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal. App. 2d 648, 652 (1969).
371. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 221–22 (discussing Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d
699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971)).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 229.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 230.
376. Id. at 231–32.
377. Id. at 232.
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tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of
justice.”378 To balance these concerns, the Court held that consent to
search is valid when “the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and
not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.”379 This
voluntariness is “to be determined from all the circumstances.”380
The Court attempted to reconcile the subjective with the objective by
directing that “[i]n examining all the surrounding circumstances to
determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account must
be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.”381
Therefore, in assessing the validity of consent to search, the Court
implemented a “vague” totality of the circumstances test that
considered the objective382—whether there was explicit or implicit
coercion applied by law enforcement and the subjective—
considering “the defendant’s level of schooling, intelligence, and
presence or absence of any warnings were relevant in considerations
in determining whether a statement [of consent] was voluntary.”383
Schneckloth remains the governing standard for when consent is
voluntarily given.384 However, as several critics have noted, the
standard has evolved away from one considering the subjective
beliefs of the suspects to one that is “wholly objective and focuses
solely on the behavior of the law enforcement official[s].”385
Professor Mary Strauss conducted a review of cases involving
consent-based searches post-Schneckloth and found that while
defendants could conceivably “try to invalidate the consent to search
based on numerous subjective factors relating to the suspect’s mental
state or character, it is a rare case in which the court actually analyzes
any of these factors.”386 She points to a number of cases to show that
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

386.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 248–49.
Id. at 229.
Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 220–21
(2001).
Simmons, supra note 350, at 778 (alteration added).
Strauss, supra note 382, at 221.
Simmons, supra note 350, at 775–76. “Although the legal test that courts have been
applying in evaluating consent searches has a subjective and an objective prong, in
fact the subjective prong has been virtually ignored for the past thirty years.” Id. at
777 (alteration added); see also Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 509, 520–21 (2015).
Strauss, supra note 382, at 221–22 (citing DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1999) (“In most of the cases,
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“[e]ven more rare is the case where the court finds them [subjective
factors] determinative and excludes the evidence.”387
Professor Ric Simmons notes that it “is an open secret that the
subjectivity requirement of Schneckloth is dead,” and that “recent
cases at every level have considered only objective criteria, such as
the location of the search, the language used in making the request,
and the behavior of the police officer.”388 The Court has been able to
shift the focus away from the subjective and solely towards the
objective by merging the consent analysis with the Fourth
Amendment analysis for when a seizure occurs.389
In United States v. Drayton, three police officers boarded a
Greyhound bus traveling from Fort Lauderdale to Detroit as part of a
routine drugs and weapons interdiction effort.390 The officers were in
plain clothes but carried concealed weapons and visible badges.391
One officer positioned himself on the driver’s seat, facing the rear of
the bus, while one officer positioned himself in the rear of the bus,
with the remaining officer approaching passengers as he moved from
the rear to the front of the bus.392 This officer approached Drayton
and Brown who were seated next to one another.393 After receiving
consent to search a bag and Brown, the officer then asked Drayton
for consent to search his person.394 Drayton responded by lifting his
hand “about eight inches from his legs,” at which point the officer
patted him down and detected “hard objects.”395 A further search
revealed that these hard objects were duct-taped plastic bundles of
cocaine.396
Drayton challenged the search on the validity of his consent.397 In
assessing the validity of the consent, the Court did not consider

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

the courts did not even discuss the subjective factors that the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth said would be relevant in determining voluntariness.”). When the Court
mentioned these subjective factors at all, it minimized them. See Adrian J. Barrio,
Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into
the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
232–33 (1997) (reiterating the Court’s ignoring of subjective factors).
Strauss, supra note 382, at 222 (alteration added).
Simmons, supra note 350, at 779.
Id. at 779–81.
536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.

2019

Traffic Stop Federalism

375

Drayton’s subjective perceptions of the request under Schneckloth,
but instead focused solely on the behavior of the officers to
determine whether Drayton was “seized” for Fourth Amendment
purposes.398 The Court concluded that
[T]he police did not seize the respondents when they
boarded the bus and began asking questions. The officers
gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were
required to answer the officers’ questions. . . . [H]e did not
brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements. . .
. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that
he or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise
terminating the encounter.”399
Thus, to the Court, the relevant inquiry was whether a reasonable
person, subject to the behavior of the police officers, would have felt
free to terminate the encounter and leave.400 In Drayton, they found
as such and the consent was found to be valid.401
The merging together of consent and a lawful seizure has created a
“fiction that treats coercion and voluntary consent as either/or
conditions in a false binary: consent that is not coerced by improper
state conduct is treated as if it is happily and freely given.”402 Quite
simply, after Drayton, if a reasonable person would have felt free to
terminate the encounter with police, then any subsequent consent
given is presumed to be valid—regardless of any subjective factors
that may have compelled the granting of consent.403
B. From Subjective to Objective—North Carolina Follows the Road
The North Carolina courts were again presented with choices after
both Schneckloth and Drayton—do they follow suit and interpret the
validity of consent-based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment or do they stray and interpret the validity of
consent-based on their own independent interpretation of the North
Carolina constitution?
398. Id. at 200–01 (relying on Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991)) (stating
that “[e]ven when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to
search luggage—provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means”).
399. Id. at 203–04.
400. Id. 201.
401. Id. at 206–07.
402. Burke, supra note 385, at 525 (citing Simmons, supra note 350, at 785).
403. See id.
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Other state courts have directly rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s
framework.404 Ohio’s Supreme Court attempted to do so in the early
1990s by requiring police officers to notify drivers of their right to
refuse consent.405 However, the Ohio Supreme Court did so under an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, not their own constitution,
which allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate that
requirement.406 Consequently, “many state courts have abandoned
any reliance on the Fourth Amendment and have looked instead to
their own state law to provide greater restrictions on police activity
during traffic stops.”407 This has led to some states interpreting their
“state constitutions to flatly forbid the police from posing any
question or request that is unrelated to the underlying reason(s) for
the traffic stop,”408 unless supported by reasonable suspicion.409
Other states have interpreted their own constitutions to allow officers
to engage in some degree of unrelated questions, to include asking
for consent, without reasonable suspicion so long the questions or
requests do not change the fundamental nature of the stop.410
North Carolina, though, has again failed to afford its drivers more
rights and has instead elected to proceed in lockstep agreement with

404. See infra notes 405–10 and accompanying text.
405. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1995).
406. Ohio v. Robinette, 591 U.S. 33, 37 (1996) (“Although the opinion below mentions
Art. I, § 14, of the Ohio Constitution in passing . . . the opinion clearly relies on
federal law nevertheless. Indeed, the only cases it discusses or even cites are federal
cases . . . .”).
407. Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 630, 636 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (“These [consent]
searches result in substantial interruption of motorists’ travels. . . . In all but
exceptional cases, these consent searches are held to be valid under the Fourth
Amendment. The federal law in this area is premised on the assumption that, all
things being equal, a motorist who does not wish to be subjected to a search will
refuse consent when the officer seeks permission to conduct a search. But experience
has shown that assumption is wrong.”).
408. Id. at 633.
409. See State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2007); State v. Brikenmeier,
888 A.2d 1283, 1290–91 (N.J. 2006) (holding that consent searches following the stop
of a vehicle are improper unless the authorities have reasonable suspicion that the
accused is engaged in criminal activity); State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418–19
(Minn. 2003) (holding that the Minnesota constitution does not permit the search of a
passenger of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop if the officer does not have
reasonable suspicion to seek consent to search); State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 908–09
(N.J. 2002).
410. See State v. McKinnon-Andrews, 846 A.2d 1198, 1203–04 (N.H. 2004) (holding that
a police officer’s asking for consent may be valid if there is “reasonable articulable
suspicion”); State v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 270 (Ill. 2003).
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the U.S. Supreme Court.411 Several years prior to Schneckloth, the
North Carolina Supreme Court considered the voluntariness of a
consent to search. In Little, the Court found that “implicit in the very
nature of the term ‘consent’ is the requirement of voluntariness.”412
Requiring the consent to be “unequivocal and specific” and “freely
and intelligently given.”413 Providing that “[t]o be voluntary, it must
be shown that the waiver was free from coercion, duress or fraud, and
not given merely to avoid resistance.”414 The North Carolina
Supreme Court implemented a totality of the circumstances test that
was similar in scope and language to the one later adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court.415 In fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court
predicated its decision on such a standard being consistent with the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of North Carolina.416
After Schneckloth effectively confirmed North Carolina’s
framework, North Carolina courts accepted Schneckloth as the
governing standard, absent any reference to the North Carolina
constitution.417 Much like under the federal framework, North
Carolina soon began diminishing the consideration of any subjective
factors.418 In Fincher, Michael Fincher was found guilty of first
degree murder on the theory of felony murder, first degree rape, and

411. Cf. Brown, 182 P.3d at 633–34 (“Both the Alaska Supreme Court and this Court have
repeatedly interpreted Article I, Section 14 to provide greater protection to the citizens
of this State than they would otherwise have under the Fourth Amendment. We have
exercised this authority when we were convinced that the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment “fails to adequately safeguard our
citizens’ right to privacy, . . . fails to adequately protect citizens from unwarranted
government intrusion, and . . . unjustifiably reduces the incentive of police officers to
honor citizen’s constitutional rights.”) (quoting Joseph v. State, 145 P.3d 595, 605
(Alaska Ct. App. 2006)).
412. State v. Little, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (N.C. 1967).
413. Id. (citing Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).
414. Id.
415. See Little, 154 S.E.2d at 65–66; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973).
416. Little, 154 S.E.2d at 65–66 (“By such a waiver and consent a defendant relinquishes
the protection of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . and also
relinquishes the protection given by Article I, section 15 of the North Carolina
Constitution.”).
417. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 293 S.E.2d 569, 582 (N.C. 1982) (“Taking into account all
of the factors enunciated in Schneckloth, we hold that defendant’s consent to the
search was voluntarily given free from coercion of any form.”).
418. See infra notes 431–43 and accompanying text.
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first degree burglary.419 He was seventeen years old at the time of the
alleged crimes and during the police investigation.420 During the
trial, he presented expert testimony that he was “mentally retarded”
and suffered from a schizophreniform disorder.421 According to the
expert, Fincher’s mental condition caused him a disturbance of his
mood and behavior along with auditory hallucinations.422 The expert
also provided that Fincher was more susceptible to “fear in a given
situation than an average individual . . . and that his ability to deal
with stress [was] limited.”423 However, the expert did provide that
Fincher could express himself to police officers.424 Lastly, the expert
testified that Fincher’s I.Q. was around 50, well below average.425
As part of the investigation, ten uniformed police officers arrived at
an apartment where Fincher lived.426 An officer prepared a consent
form to search Fincher’s bedroom and presented it to Fincher.427
Fincher signed the form, granting permission to the police officers to
search his room.428 During trial, he challenged his ability to
voluntarily give consent-based on subjective considerations—the fear
caused by the presence of ten police officers, his low IQ, and his
mental illness.429 The trial court found his consent to be voluntary
and thus valid.430
The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that Schneckloth
controlled its analysis as to whether Fincher’s consent was
voluntarily given.431 However, the court summarily dismissed the
subjective factors arguing against voluntary consent, equating
Fincher’s age and mental condition with the voluntariness of a
confession.432 The court found that a “defendant’s subnormal mental
capacity is a factor to be considered . . . [s]uch lack of intelligence
does not, however, standing alone, render an in-custody statement
incompetent if it is in all other respects voluntary and

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

North Carolina v. Fincher, 305 S.E.2d 685, 687 (N.C. 1983).
Id. at 691.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. A different expert did estimate Fincher’s verbal IQ to be 65. Id.
Id. at 689.
Id.
Id. at 690.
See id.
See id. at 691.
Id. at 689 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
See id. at 690–91.
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understandingly made.”433 Similarly, the court found that “the fact
that the defendant is youthful will not preclude the admission of his
inculpatory statement absent mistreatment or coercion by police
officers.”434 The court gave no consideration to the fact that the
presence of ten police officers may have created a subjective fear in
Fincher that implicitly coerced his consent.435
Instead, the court focused on objective factors to determine
Fincher’s consent was voluntary.436 Mainly, the Court relied on the
fact that Fincher appeared to be “alert, coherent, [was] not under the
influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs; that . . . [he] was [not]
threatened, nor . . . promised or offered any reward . . . That no
threats or suggested violence or show of violence to law enforcement
officers to persuade or induce the defendant[] to waive [his]
rights.”437 To the Court, so long as the “defendant understood the
form and that no force or coercion was used against him[,]”438
Fincher “voluntarily, willingly, and understandingly consented to the
search of his bedroom.”439
Fincher established a baseline for voluntariness of consent to
search—establishing that subjective components, such as mental
illness, age, and the presence of many police officers, would not
render consent invalid so long as there was no evidence of direct
coercion.440 Beyond limiting the subjective prong of Schneckloth,
North Carolina courts also followed the trend of conflating the
voluntariness of consent with the lawfulness of a seizure standard.
Following Drayton, the North Carolina courts considered the
appropriateness of consent in several different contexts not by
applying Schneckloth’s totality of the circumstances test, but by
asking whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate

433. Id. at 690. The Court conflates the voluntariness of consent with the voluntariness of
a confession, stating, “[s]uch lack of intelligence does not, however, standing alone,
render an in-custody statement incompetent if it is in all other respects voluntary and
understandingly made.” Id. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 268 S.E.2d 458, 463 (N.C.
1980)).
434. Id. The Court again turns to the analysis of when a confession is voluntarily given,
“[a]lthough age is also to be considered by the trial judge in ruling upon the
admissibility of a defendant’s confession . . . .” Id.
435. See supra notes 431–33 and accompanying text.
436. Fincher, 305 S.E.2d at 691.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 690–91.
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the encounter with the police and leave.441 While North Carolina’s
adoption of this approach resulted in some consent-based searches
being deemed invalid, it still resulted in the subjective being ignored
in favor of the objective.442 Consents to search were deemed invalid
for objective reasons, such as a driver’s license not being returned,
but not based on any subjective concern held by the driver. 443
Recently, North Carolina courts hinted a return to the Schneckloth
voluntariness test, but again indicated that the objective prong will
far outweigh subjective prong.444 In State v. Bartlett, referenced at
the beginning of this section, Bartlett consented to a search of his
person after several police officers stopped his vehicle and ordered
him out of the vehicle.445 Bartlett challenged his consent in part on
subjective factors, mainly that “he consented only in acquiescence ‘to
the coercive environment fostered by the police.’”446 His argument
was based on his race, noting that “there is strong evidence that
people of color will view a ‘request’ to search by the police as an
inherently coercive command.”447 Bartlett argued that his race “gives
pause to whether [his] consent” was “genuinely voluntary.”448
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided Bartlett’s case not on
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to deny the police
officer’s request on leave, but rather on the totality of the
circumstances test, acknowledging that “race may be a relevant factor
in considering whether his consent was voluntary.”449 Nonetheless,
441. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 617 S.E.2d 1, 13 (N.C. 2005) (“Seizure of a person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs ‘only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he
was not free to leave.’ . . . Thus, ‘[e]ven when law enforcement officers have no basis
for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification,
and request consent to search.’” (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002))); State v. Kincaid,
555 S.E.2d 294, 299 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“A reasonable person, under the
circumstances, would have felt free to leave when the documents were returned. . . .
Sergeant Splain was neither prohibited from simply asking if defendant would
consent to additional questioning, nor was the officer prohibited from questioning
defendant after receiving his consent.”).
442. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 681 S.E.2d 492, 497 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
443. See, e.g., id. (holding that “a reasonable person under the circumstances would
certainly not believe he was free to leave without his driver’s license and
registration”); cf. supra note 292 and accompanying text.
444. See infra notes 445–55 and accompanying text.
445. State v. Bartlett, 818 S.E.2d 710, 715 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
446. Id. at 714.
447. Id. at 715.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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the Court then gave much greater consideration to the objective
factors presented in support of the consent being voluntarily given.450
Specifically, the court pointed out that only one officer interacted
with Bartlett and that the “overall circumstances presented at the
suppression hearing tended to show that [Bartlett] consented ‘freely
and intelligently[,]’ and not to merely avoid resistance.”451
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Bartlett is significant for several
reasons. Potentially, it marked a return to Schneckloth and the
totality of the circumstances test, and a possible turn away from
Drayton’s consideration as to whether a reasonable person would feel
free to leave.452 It also reflected the possibility that North Carolina
courts could find someone’s race and his or her subjective fears
predicated upon that race’s prior history with police officers as a
consideration in whether consent is validly given.453 Nonetheless,
Bartlett is also significant in that it shows the North Carolina courts’
rejection of traffic stop federalism regarding consent-based searches;
mainly, that North Carolina courts could interpret their own
constitution to require some sort of suspicion before asking for
consent and they fail to do so.454 Finally, Bartlett reflects that even
when North Carolina courts consider race, the subjective fears that
come along with it will be subservient to objective considerations
that support a finding that consent was voluntarily given.455
C. Consent and the Black Driver
The framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court, and
followed by the North Carolina, is in direct conflict with the black
experience in the United States.456 Regardless of whether courts will
apply the totality of the circumstances test from Schneckloth or the
“would a reasonable person feel free to leave” test from Drayton,
little consideration, if any, will be given to the subjective beliefs of
the driver.457 This conflict is especially relevant in the case of the
black driver, whose subjective fear of police officers may incentivize
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. See U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205 (2002); Bartlett, 818 S.E.2d at 714 (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
453. See Bartlett, 818 S.E.2d at 715.
454. See id. at 715–16.
455. See id. at 715.
456. See discussion supra Sections III.A–B.
457. See supra note 454 and accompanying text; see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227;
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.
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coerced obedience to the request for consent, resulting in more
consent-based searches.458 By not considering the subjective beliefs
of the black driver, courts allow for police officers to ask for consent
to search throughout the traffic stop process without any suspicion or
consideration as to whether a black driver ever can truly deny the
request from police officers.459
Professor Strauss explored the inherent tension in consent-based
searches and the black experience in the United States.460 She noted
that “[e]ven in the ‘best’ of circumstances—a polite officer, without
gun drawn, familiar circumstances for the consenter—people consent
in situations where they have only something to lose.”461 She
referenced psychology studies that supported “the general idea that
obedience to authority is deeply ingrained, that people will obey
authority even when it is not in their own best interest to do so, and
that obedience increases with when the authority figure has visible
trappings of authority, such as a uniform.”462 While noting the
limitations of the studies, Strauss concluded that “people follow or
obey a ‘request’ made by police officers in authority positions in
situations where there is not only no ostensible benefit to do so, there
is likely harm.”463
To Professor Strauss, the concern that most individuals, regardless
of race, will view the authority of police as inherently coercive is
especially problematic, as “certain segments of society will see even
the politest ‘request’ by an officer that way.”464 Specifically, she
argues that many blacks know that “refusing to accede to the
authority of the police, and even seemingly polite requests–can have
deadly consequences.”465 She concludes that “[g]iven this sad history
[of police abuse], it can be presumed that at least for some persons of
color, any police request for consent to search will be viewed as an
unequivocal demand to search that is disobeyed or challenged only at
significant risk of bodily harm.”466
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See supra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 453 and accompanying text.
See Strauss, supra note 382, at 221.
Id. at 236.
Id. (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW
13–26 (1974); Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 47, 47–49 (1974)).
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 242–43.
Id. at 243.
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So, what does this mean for black drivers in North Carolina?
Consider the hypothetical black driver from the earlier sections.467
She may be stopped for several innocent factors that the police
officer subjectively believes to be suspicious—such as slowing
down, appearing evasive, or not making eye contact with the police
officer. Or, she may be stopped for probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of a traffic code violation—such as going seven miles per
hour over the speed limit, changing lanes without signaling, or
having an object hanging from her review view mirror. Regardless
of the basis for the stop, the police may then ask for her consent to
search without any suspicion of additional wrongdoing beyond the
purpose of the stop. Appearing at her driver’s side window while
stopped at the side of the road, a police officer may then, in a polite
voice and without any show of force, ask for consent to search. The
driver, made nervous and fearful of police officers by a history of
abuse by police officers towards blacks, feels she has no choice to
consent. The officer then searches the vehicle to support his
subjective hunch based on racial bias that led him to follow the
vehicle initially.
Much like the basis for the stop and the use of a drug-sniffing dog,
the hypothetical driver has little recourse to challenge the validity of
her consent. Like Bartlett, she may claim that her subjective fears of
police officers coerced her consent, but as in Bartlett, North Carolina
courts are likely to give more credence to the objective factors
supporting consent—the police officer not presenting any show of
force and his use of a polite voice.468 And consequently, courts will
likely find the consent to be valid and sanction the entirety of the
police officer’s actions, starting the encounter based on his racial
bias, following the vehicle awaiting for some objective reason to
stop, and then obtaining consent to search the vehicle, without ever
considering the black driver’s subjective fears of police encounters.
CONCLUSION
Black drivers are disproportionately stopped and searched by
police officers.469 While this is a nationwide problem, the racial
disparity is especially prevalent in North Carolina where black
drivers are stopped disproportionate to their population and are

467. See supra text accompanying notes 241–43 and 343–45.
468. See discussion supra Part III.
469. See supra notes 17–28 and accompanying text.
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subsequently searched more than twice as often as white drivers.470
The legal cause of this racial disparity is the conflicted traffic stop
framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court.471 Throughout
the traffic stop framework, the U.S. Supreme Court endorses the
subjective beliefs of a police officer by allowing the police officer to
follow a vehicle based on a “hunch.”472 An officer’s history and
background turn innocent factors into suspicion, which support the
initial stop, prolong the stop for a drug dog, and leave it to the
individual police officer to determine whether to use a drug-sniffing
dog.473 Meanwhile, this framework does not consider the subjective
beliefs, formed by the black experience in the United States, of the
black driver.474 It fails to consider a black driver’s inherent
nervousness and fear of police officers and how it may impact their
driving, their behavior during the stop, and his or her willingness to
consent to a search.475 When these ends of the framework intersect, it
results in the behavior of the black driver who is impacted by his or
her subjective beliefs and fears of police officers forming the basis
for additional police interference.476
The appropriate normative legal solution to fix this problem is
traffic stop federalism. North Carolina courts could interpret its state
constitution and ask the following questions to protect its black
drivers: Whether a reasonable police officer would have made the
stop? Whether the conduct deemed suspicious by the police officer
was instead innocent conduct reflecting the subjective fears of the
black driver, only made suspicious by the officer’s implicit racial
bias? Whether reasonable suspicion supported the use of a drug dog?
Whether there was probable cause to prolong a stop to wait for the
drug dog? And, whether some suspicion must be required to ask for
consent or even whether a black driver could ever truly consent to a
police officer’s request?
North Carolina courts repeatedly refused to ask any of these
questions and instead blindly acquiesced to the conflicted framework
established by the U.S. Supreme Court.477 The result is that black
drivers will continue to be stopped and searched and that cycle of
negative police encounters with black drivers will continue. Blacks
470.
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See supra notes 50–61 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
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See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Sections I.D, II.E.
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will continue to be fearful and distrustful of the police in North
Carolina, and the outward manifestation of these subjective beliefs
will subsequently provide more objective support for police officers
to continue with the constant stopping and searching of black
drivers.478
Although North Carolina courts appear to reject traffic stop
federalism, its experience is relevant to its legislature, other states,
and the federal judiciary.479 The U.S. Supreme Court framework is
failing black drivers and perpetuating distrust between law
enforcement and the black community. Through seeing the failure of
its court system, the North Carolina legislature can abandon the U.S.
Supreme Court’s framework through legislative reform. Other states
can heed North Carolina’s warning call and implement traffic stop
federalism when their constitutions make it appropriate. Lastly, the
federal judiciary should look at the North Carolina experience to see
the failure of its framework and to instead endorse the rights of black
drivers, which they should have been protecting all along.

478. See supra Sections I.D, III.B.
479. See supra Sections I.C, II.B, II.D, III.B.
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